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INTRODUCTION
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction Between Public and Private International Law
In the recent past, prestigious courts around the world have refused
to adjudicate cases relating to foreign registered or unregistered
intellectual property rights (hereinafter: IPRs), where the proceedings
concerned an IPR infringement claim or where the defendant in an IPR
infringement action or the claimant in a declaratory action to establish
that the IPR is not infringed pleaded that the IPR is invalid or void and
that there is also no infringement of that right for that reason (so called
1
validity issues incidentally raised). In these cases the refusal to
adjudicate the foreign IPRs infringement and validity claims was
grounded on exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction (exclusive
2
jurisdiction) rules. According to those rules, the State that granted or
recognized the IPR has the exclusive jurisdiction to address claims
related thereto, independent of its also having personal jurisdiction over
3
the defendant. Among those decisions are the Supreme Court of
4
Appeal of the South Africa Republic’s Gallo v. Sting Music decision of
1. The decisions on the validity issues incidentally raised have usually inter partes
effects, whereas the judgments on validity issues principally raised have erga omnes effects.
See also infra in the content of the paper.
2. Of a statutory or a case law nature, see infra.
3. See also the judgments referred to in Toshiyuki Kono & Paulius Jurčys, XVIIIth
Int’l Congress on Comparative Law, Intellectual Property and Private Int’l Law (provisional
draft of the general report) (July 2010), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INT’L
LAW § II.4 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., Martinus Nijhof) (forthcoming); and the decisions quoted by
the following national reports on Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Matters of Intellectual
Property, (forthcoming) id.; Marie-Christine Janssens, The Relationship between Intellectual
Property Law and Int’l Private Law viewed from a Belgian Perspective § I.II.2.1.3; Joost Blom,
Report for Canada (including Quebec), subsection II.A; Ivana Kunda, Report for Croatia,
subsection I.B; Marie-Elodie Ancel, Report for France, subsection I.ii; Axel Metzger, Report
for Germany, subsection I.2.a.(1); Vandana Singh, Report for India, subsection I.2; Nerina
Boschiero and Benedetta Ubertazzi, Report for Italy, subsection II. case 2, available at 16
Cardozo
Electronic
Law
Bulletin
291
(2010),
available
at
http://www.unipa.it/scienzepolitiche/files/Italian%20National%20Reports%20to%20Washing
ton%202010.pdf; Dai Yokomizo, Report for Japan, subsection 1.1.2; Alexandre Dias Pereira,
Report for Portugal, subsection I.B.2.2; Damjan Možina for Slovenia, subsection I.II.1; Pedro
De Miguel Asensio, Report for Spain, subsection 1.2.1-3; Amélie Charbon, Report for
Switzerland, subsection I.1; Dick Van Engelen, Report for The Netherlands, subsection 3.6.
4. Gallo Africa Ltd. v. Sting Music (Pty) Ltd. 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA) (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2010/96.html. This decision was delivered
when this Paper had already been submitted for publication. Thus, this Paper can only note
the conclusion of the decision, according to which “South Africa court has no jurisdiction to
hear copyright infringement claims in respect of foreign copyright.” Id. However, this
conclusion is analogous, mutatis mutandis, to the Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009]
EWCA (Civ) 1328 judgment’s conclusion that will be addressed here in detail. Therefore, the
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March 9, 2010; the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit’s
5
January 2, 2007 decision in Voda v. Cordis Corp.; the U.K. Court of
Appeal’s December 16, 2009 decision in Lucasfilm Entertainment Co. v.
6
Ainsworth; and the Court of Justice of the European Union GAT
7
decision of July, 13 2006.
remarks relating to the Lucasfilm decision may be extended, mutatis mutandis, to the South
African Gallo judgment.
5. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See Jane Ginsburg, Jurisdiction
and Recognition of Judgments under the ALI Principles, in LITIGATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU REGULATIONS, ALI PRINCIPLES, CLIP
PROJECT (Stefania Bariatti ed., CEDAM 2010).
6. Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 (Eng.). Jacob LJ
delivered the court’s judgment which has not yet become res judicata. On this judgment, see
Paul Torremans, Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth, 7 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
751 (2010); Andrew Dickinson, The Force be with the EU? Infringements of US Copyright in
the English Courts, 2 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL L.Q. 181, 181 (2010). On the
Court of First Instance decision of this same case, see Graeme Austin, The Concept of
“Justiciability” in Foreign Copyright Infringement Cases, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 393 (2009). See also the recent English judgment Royal Courts of Justice,
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL, Crosstown Music Company 1, LLC v. Rive Droite Music Ltd.,
[2009] EWHC Civ 1222, partly available at http://vlex.co.uk/vid/hc07c01296-55141239 (in
which an attempt by one party to argue for a wider application of the U.K. Court of Appeal
Lucasfilm case failed).
7. The Court of Justice of the European Union is the former European Court of
Justice, for simplicity reasons this court will hereafter be recalled as ECJ. With this judgment
the ECJ pronounced not on its jurisdiction, but rather on the jurisdiction of the courts of the
EU member States. See Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509. For critics of this
decision, see Annette Kur, A Farewell to Cross-Border Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT
v. LuK and Roche Nederland v. Primus and Goldenberg, 7 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 844 (2006); Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Exclusive Juridiction
and Cross Border IP (Patent) Infringement. Suggestions for Amendment of the Brussels I
Regulation, available at http://www-cl-ip.eu; Lydia Lundstedt, In the Wake of GAT/LuK and
Roche/Primus, 2 NIR 122, 123 (2008); Paul Torremans, The Widening Reach of Exclusive
Jurisdiction: Where Can You Litigate IP Rights after GAT?, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 61 (Arnaud Nuyts ed., 2008);
Marcus Norrgård, A Spider Without a Web? Multiple Defendants in IP Litigation, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (Leible & Ohly eds.,
2009); Luigi Fumagalli, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights Disputes Cross-Border:
Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments under the Brussels I Regulation 15 in LITIGATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU REGULATIONS, ALI
PRINCIPLES, CLIP PROJECT (Stefania Bariatti ed., 2010); Annette Kur. & Benedetta
Ubertazzi, The ALI Principles and the CLIP Project–a Comparison, section 1 and subsection
2.c in LITIGATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTES CROSS-BORDER: EU
REGULATIONS, ALI PRINCIPLES, CLIP PROJECT (Stefania Bariatti ed., 2010). See also the
national reports recalled at footnote 3 of this paper. But Cf., Manlio Frigo, Proprietà
intellettuale, Gli standards di tutela dell’UE a confronto con gli standard internazionali,
Address at the Italian Society of International Law XV Congress in Bologna (June 10–11,
2010),
available
at
http://streaming.cineca.it/SIDIXV/play.php?dim_get=320&player_get=flash&flusso_get=flash (according to which the GAT
decision should be positively evaluated since it grants the principle of legal certainty in
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These decisions are grounded on the assumption that since IPRs
relate to a State’s sovereignty or domestic policies, IPRs are granted
through State acts and are limited to the territory of the State that
granted them. Therefore, if a State other than that which granted or
recognized the IPR exercised jurisdiction, this State would create an
unreasonable interference with the State who initially granted or
recognized the IPR at stake. To avoid this unreasonable interference,
the petitioned courts decline jurisdiction in foreign IPRs cases. This
declination of jurisdiction is not the result of any general public
international law obligation, but rather is a discretionary act of selfrestraint based on domestic rules of international procedural law
grounded on reasons of comity to the courts and on the act of State
doctrine. (Hereafter, “comity to the courts” and the “act of State
8
doctrine.” These terms are interchangeable throughout this Paper.)
Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that these comity rules are of a
domestic nature, the same rules are rooted in the concept of territorial
sovereignty within a system of equal nation-States. Thus, “even more
important that the conflicts of law rules themselves are the basic
9
contours of comity . . . namely” the goals that must be accomplished by
adopting it, among which stays the need to avoid harmful effects on
international stability and interaction among nations and “the practical
desirability of making decisions which would ‘further the development
10
of an effectively functioning international system.’” Therefore, “the
question of extending comity touches upon issues concerning the
interaction of sovereign nations—matters typically within the scope of
11
public international law” and comity can be defined as a non-binding
principle governing international affairs or as “a bridge between public

conformity with Article 6 of the ECHR. Indeed, as will be explained in greater detail infra,
this last Article militates against exclusive jurisdiction provisions).
8. To consider the act of State doctrine as an extension of comity read Jake S. Tyshow,
Informal Foreign Affairs Formalism: The Act of State Doctrine and the Reinterpretation of
International Comity, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 278, 298 (2002). This article also describes the
similarities and the differences between comity and the act of State doctrine.
9. Nadine Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of
International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601, 623 (2006).
10. Id. at 622.
11. Id. at 619. See also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads:
an Intersection between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281
(1982) (“the doctrine of comity is not a rule of public international law, but the term
characterizes many of those same functional elements that define a system of international
legal order”). See also Thomas H. Hill, Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine.
Theory and Policy in United States Law, 46 RABELSZ 126 (1982).
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12

and private international law.”
The decisions here examined, then, seem in line with attempts to
develop a general public international law theory of allocation of
jurisdiction in civil matters that began in the 18th century in the
Netherlands, that continued to develop in Anglo-American legal
systems, that were popular in Germany around the turn of the 19th
13
century that “have more recently been revived by [certain] public
14
15
international lawyers,” and that are based on “comity” reasons. In
contrast, this Paper adopts the opinion that “these attempts have been
16
unsuccessful”; public international law does not limit a State’s exercise
17
of jurisdiction inside its borders, and “public international law can play
12. See Calamita, supra note 9, at 619. See also Jörn Axel KÄMMERER J.A., Comity,
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2006),
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_articles_by_author2?author=K%C3%A4mmerer,%20J%
C3%B6rn%20Axel&letter=K.
See also CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (2008).
13. See the studies of Ulrich Huber and Story, referred to by Maier, supra note 11, at
280, (collecting and construing resources) and respectively the studies of Zitelmann and
Frankenstein, referred to by Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German
Views on Global Issues, 4 J. PUB. INT’L L. 125 (2008).
14. See Michaels, supra note 13.
15. Id. at 130. See also Maier, supra note 11, at 281. On comity as a PIL rule in
general see Lawrence Collins, The United States Supreme Court and the Principles of Comity:
Evidence in Transnational Litigation, 8 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 53 (2006); Donald Earl
Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010); Francisco Javier Zamora Cabot, On The International Comity
In The Private International Law System Of The U.S.A, 19 Revista Electrónica de Estudios
Internacionales
1
(2010)
available
at
http://www.reei.org/reei19/doc/Nota_ZAMORA_FranciscoJavier.pdf. On comity as a PIL
rule with respect to IPRs, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 58 (Cambridge University Press 2000). See also William Patry, Choice of Law
and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 416 (2000), who, however, concentrates
on copyright conflict of laws issues rather than on the international procedural matters
examined here.
16. Michaels, supra note 13, at 125, 130. See also ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. JUSTICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN
THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRIVATE LAW 23 (Cambridge
University Press 2009).
17. Save in exceptional cases, such as those concerning subjects that are immune from
foreign jurisdiction. On the immunity from jurisdiction with respect to issues related to IPRs,
see Virginia MORRIS, Sovereign Immunity: The Exception for Intellectual Property, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 83, 115 (1986); Akihiro Matsui, Intellectual Property Litigation and
Foreign Sovereign Immunity: International Law Limit to the Jurisdiction over the Infringement
of Intellectual Property, INST. INTELL. PROP. BULL. 2003, available at
http://www.iip.or.jp/e/summary/pdf/detail2002/e14_20.pdf; Benedetta Ubertazzi, Intellectual
Property and State Immunity from Jurisdiction in the New York Convention of 2004, 11 Y.B.
PRIVATE INT’L L. 599 (2009) (collecting and construing necessary case law references
originating in different countries).
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a role in private international law [only] in . . . the broader conception of
18
human rights,” imposing on the States the granting of the right of
access to courts and therefore the abandoning of their international
jurisdiction provisions inconsistent with this right, namely the
19
20
exorbitant and exclusive jurisdiction rules, of which this paper
examines only the latter and in relation to IPRs.
As a conclusion, this paper adopts and develops a thesis according to
which exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPRs cases are not suggested by
public international law; are actually illegal according to its rules on the
denial of justice and on the fundamental human right of access to courts;
and therefore, must be abandoned not only with respect to IPRs
infringement issues, but also to IPRs validity claims raised as a defense
21
in infringements proceedings, as the majority of the scholars maintain
and the most recent academic initiatives like the ALI Principles and the
22
CLIP Project codify.
B. Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives
Finally, with respect to international jurisdiction, it is necessary to
highlight that the basic terminology, and legal institutions adopted in
Europe diverge considerably from those of the U.S. system, since
“European law does not distinguish between personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, whereas American law does not employ the
23
categories of general, special and exclusive jurisdiction.” However, on
18. Michaels, supra note 13, at 125, 130 (collecting and construing resources).
19. See Carlo Focarelli, The Right of Aliens not to be Subject to So-Called “Excessive”
Civil Jurisdiction, in ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 441 (Benedetto
Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997); Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, Compétence
exclusive et compétence exorbitante dans les relations privées internationales, 323 RECUEIL
DES COURS 9 (2006); Giuditta Cordero Moss, Between Private and Public International Law:
Exorbitant Jurisdiction as Illustrated by the Yukos Case, 32 REV. CENT. E. EUROPEAN L. 1
(2007); RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 165; Nerina Boschiero, Las reglas de competencia
judicial de la Unión Europea en el espacio jurídico internacional, 9 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 35, 47 (2009) (collecting and construing resources).
See also the doctrine quoted infra 176.
20. For the abandoning of any exclusive jurisdiction provision see Fernández Arroyo,
supra note 19, passim.
21. See the ALI Principles, infra note 84. See the CLIP Principles, infra note 86.
22. The majority of the doctrine is against exclusive jurisdiction rules in relation to
IPRs infringement proceedings and validity issues incidentally raised. See the doctrine that
severely criticizes the ECJ GAT decision indicated at supra note 6. See also the doctrine
mentioned at supra note 1. Contra see Frigo, supra note 7.
23. Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at 140. See also Anna Gardella & Luca Radicati di
Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Market Integration: EC Approach to Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 611 (2003); Arnaud Nuyts, Due Process and Fair Trial:
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the one hand, “American and European law provide functionally
equivalent methods for resolving the same problems, [albeit] they
24
cannot agree on, much less unify, these methods.” On the other hand,
at least with respect to IPR cases, it seems that a “good part of the
25
26
impression” that the two systems are “significantly different” “ensues
from differences in style and structure rather than from differences in
27
substance.”
Therefore, although this Paper adopts the notion of
exclusive jurisdiction, which is rooted in the European legal tradition
rather than the U.S. categories of personal and subject matter
jurisdictions, it aims at proposing and demonstrating a thesis applicable
at least to both of these legal systems.

I. THESES PURPORTING THAT COMITY, THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
AND THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE ESTABLISH IMPLICIT
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION RULES
A. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Voda Judgment
and the U.K. Court of Appeal Lucasfilm Decision
In this framework, this Paper starts analyzing the first thesis, which
purports that comity and the territoriality principle establish exclusive
jurisdiction in the State courts that granted or recognized a registered or
28
unregistered IPR, with respect to both its validity and infringement.
This thesis was recently adopted, inter alia, by two important sovereign
court decisions, namely the Voda v. Cordis U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit judgment and the Lucasfilm Entertainment Co. v.
Ainsworth U.K. Court of Appeal decision. In the Voda case, the
plaintiff, Voda, was a U.S. resident, while the defendant, Cordis, was a
29
U.S.-based entity.
Voda owned several U.S., European, British,
Canadian, French, and German patents related to a single invention,
Jurisdiction in the United States and in Europe Compared, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN EUROPE AND RELATIONS WITH THIRD STATES 157 (Arnaud Nuyts &
Nadine Watté eds., 2005); Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1003, 1011 (2006).
24. Michaels, supra note 23, at 1011.
25. Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at 92.
26. Michaels, supra note 23, at 1011.
27. Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at 92.
28. Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I, Introduction.
29. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For further details
concerning this case, see also infra Section VI. Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a Denial of
Justice and Violates the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts.
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30

which Voda claimed Cordis infringed. Cordis did not object to Voda’s
claim of U.S. patent infringement, but opposed Voda’s infringement
claims concerning the European, British, Canadian, French and German
patents, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
31
such claims. The court accepted Cordis’ argument, and thus refused to
32
examine Voda’s foreign patent infringement claims.
In Lucasfilm, the U.S. plaintiffs sued in a U.S. Court two defendants
domiciled in the United Kingdom, claiming that the defendants had
infringed the plaintiffs’ U.S. copyrights with respect to a number of
33
works created for the film Star Wars. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants’ infringement activity was “all actually done in or from the
U.K. [by virtue of] . . . sales to U.S. customers in the U.S. by dispatch of
products from the U.K., advertising on the internet and the placing of
34
advertisements in U.S. publications.”
As the defendants did not
appear before the court, the U.S. Court rendered default judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs condemning the defendant for infringing the
plaintiffs’ U.S. copyrights. The U.S. plaintiffs then asked a U.K. Court
to enforce its U.S. judgment against the defendants domiciled in the
United Kingdom. The U.K. Court of Appeal denied this enforcement
request, stating that since “the mere selling of goods from country A
into country B does not amount to the presence of the seller in country
35
B,” the defendants were not to be considered present in the United
States under U.K. international jurisdiction rules that require a
defendants’ physical presence in the forum State for the forum State’s
36
courts to adjudicate a case against them. Therefore, the U.S. Court
37
lacked personal jurisdiction to hear the case. In response, the U.S.
plaintiffs asked the U.K. Court to start a new proceeding on the merits
38
to “enforce the U.S. copyright” directly in the United Kingdom. The
U.K. Court of Appeal denied this request as well, holding that foreign
39
IPRs are not enforceable in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the decision
30. Id. at 890.
31. Id. at 891.
32. Id. at 905.
33. Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328, ¶ 5 (Eng.). For
further details concerning this case, see also infra Section VI. Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a
Denial of Justice and Violates the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts.
34. Id. at 100.
35. Id. at 192.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 187–194.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 194.
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of the U.K. Court of Appeal has not yet become a res judicata, since
40
Lucasfilm appealed to the House of Lords/U.K. Supreme Court.
In both the Voda and Lucasfilm cases, the respective U.S. and U.K.
Courts of Appeals reached their conclusions based on two different
41
arguments related to comity and the territoriality principle. The first
argument was grounded on the “act of State doctrine . . . [which]
requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns
42
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.”
This
argument purports that the rules that govern “relations between
43
sovereigns’” and that establish “comity and the principle of avoiding
44
unreasonable interference with the authority of other sovereigns”

40. The U.K. Supreme Court is a new body meant to replace the House of Lords’
traditional power as the high court in the United Kingdom.
41. See supra, Section I. Introduction.
42. Voda, 476 F.3d at 904. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Newman for a
discussion on the act of State doctrine and on the reasons against its adoption in relation to
IPRs; specifically quoting U.S. case law that “rejected the theory that ‘the mere issuance of
patents by a foreign power constitutes either an act of state, as the term has developed under
case law, or an example of governments’ compulsion.’” Id. See also Curtis Bradley,
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual Property Law: Territorial Intellectual Property
Rights in an Age of Globalization, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Peter Nicolas, The Use of
Preclusion Doctrine, Antisuit Injunctions, and Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in
Transnational Intellectual Property Litigation, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 363 (1999), quoting
relevant U.S. case law according to which
in those cases in which the courts have traditionally invoked the act of
state doctrine ‘the crucial acts occurred as a result of a considered policy
determination by a government to give effect to its political and public
interests[,] matters that would have significant impact on American
foreign relations’. In contrast, . . . the grant of a patent for floor coverings
is merely a ‘ministerial activity’ and thus ‘not the type of sovereign activity
that would be of substantial concern to the executive branch in its conduct
of international affairs.’
The same conclusion is reached in relation to copyright by Graeme Dinwoodie, Conflicts and
International Copyright Litigation: the Role of International Norms, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 210 (Jüergen Basedow, Josef Drexl, Annette Kur &
Axel Metzger eds., 2005) and in relation to IPRs in general by Pedro De Miguel, Cross-border
Adjudication of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition between Jurisdictions, 41
ANNALI ITALIANI DEL DIRITO D’AUTORE 105, n.112 (2007). On the act of State doctrine
and on the reasons against its adoption in international public law in general, and thus not
only with respect to IPRs, see BENEDETTO CONFORTI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, 232 (7th
ed. 2006).
43. Voda, 476 F.3d at 900.
44. Lucasfilm, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 at 171 (recalling the Voda judgment). On the
comity reasons with respect to IPRs, see supra note 12, and note 43.

UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/20/2011 1:06 PM

I.P. RIGHTS AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

367

45

(general public international law rules) limit the exercise of
international jurisdiction by a State on foreign matters that are the
expression of another State’s sovereignty or domestic policies.
Registered and unregistered IPRs are among those matters, since such
rights are an expression of the sovereignty of the States that grant or
46
recognize them, or are an expression of such State’s local policies and
47
interests. As a consequence, both versions of this thesis—both the
version of the Voda case and the Lucasfilm case respectively—advance
that courts decline the exercise of their jurisdictions regarding matters
related to both the validity and infringement of foreign IPRs, since “a
world in which states regularly claimed jurisdiction over the property
rights established by other nationals would be a world in which the
48
principle of negative comity would have largely vanished.” Thus, both
versions of this thesis posit that comity reasons implicitly establish
exclusive jurisdiction in the State granting or recognizing each IPR with
respect to the validity and infringement thereof.
The second argument advanced in the Voda and Lucasfilm cases is
49
grounded on the territoriality principle. According to this argument,
45. See supra, Section I. Introduction.
46. Voda, 476 F.3d at 902 according to which “[i]t would be incongruent to allow the
sovereign power of one to be infringed or limited by another sovereign’s extension of its
jurisdiction” with respect to a foreign patent infringement claim.
47. Lucasfilm, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 [159, 176] according to which “[i]nfringement
of an IP right (especially copyright, which is largely unharmonized) is essentially a local
matter involving local policies and local public interest” and “enforcement may involve a
clash of the IP policies of different countries.”
48. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 58, explaining that this way of
thinking originated in the beginning of the IPRs history, namely in the so called territorial
period. For the arguments against the adoption of comity reasons in the current IPRs era, so
called globalized period, see the following remarks.
49. On the territoriality principle and on the reasons against its interpretation as an
international jurisdiction rule in relation to IPRs, see Josef Drexl, Internationales
Immateralgüterrecht, 11 MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH
819, 820 (2006); Nerina Boschiero, Il principio di territorialità in materia di proprietà
intellettuale: conflitti di leggi e giurisdizione, 41 ANNALI ITALIANI DEL DIRITO D’AUTORE 34,
99 (2007); Graeme Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law:
the Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (2009); Alexander Peukert,
Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law, in
BEYOND
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
(GUNTHER Handl & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2011), available at http://www.jura.unifrankfurt.de/ifrv1/peukert/forschung/Territoriality_and_Extraterritoriality_in_Intellectual_Pr
operty_Law.pdf. On a comparative analysis of the territoriality principle adopted as a
conflict of law rule and on the current discussion concerning its appropriateness, see Riccardo
Luzzatto, Problemi Internazionalprivatistici del Diritto di Autore, 25 RIVISTA DI
INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 278, 278 (1989); Riccardo Luzzatto, Proprietà
Intellettuale e Diritto Internazionale, in PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE E CONCORRENZA 900,
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the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (CUP),
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
51
52
(CUB), the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and the TRIPs
53
agreement establish the principle of the independence of each State’s
domestic IPR system, as well as the principle of territoriality of the
enforcement of IPRs. As both the domestic independence principle and
the territorial enforcement principle are grounded on the territoriality
principle, they will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the
territoriality principle. According to the argument advanced in the
Voda and Lucasfilm cases, the territoriality principle implies the
“independence of each country’s sovereign . . . system[] for
54
adjudicating” its IPRs and does not allow any interference in the
foreign country’s IPR system. Within this framework, interference
purportedly occurs whenever a domestic court adjudicates a foreign IPR
901 (2004); BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 58. See also Kono & Jurčys supra
note 3, at n.1, subsection III.9.3.
50.
Adopted in 1883, as amended on July 14, 1967, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements
and
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp.
51.
Adopted in 1886, as amended on September 28, 1979, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements
and
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp.
52. Treaty of Washington adopted in 1970, as amended on October 3, 2001, available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements
and
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp.
53. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),
annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in
Marrakesh,
Morocco
on
April
15,
1994,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#agreements
and
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/summary.jsp for the text of this treaty. The TRIPs agreement
incorporates various IP conventional norms by reference, including the principles of
territoriality and national treatment. However, the TRIPs agreement also
departs from the long tradition whereby international IP conventions
confined themselves to imposing on Members only negative obligations,
in particular by requiring national treatment of foreigners, and takes the
unprecedented step of mandating positive obligations, including mostfavoured nation treatment and greatly expanding minimum IP protection
standards.
Marco Ricolfi, The First Ten Years of the TRIPs Agreement: Is There an Antitrust Antidote
Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305, 331 (2006).
See also Marco Ricolfi, The Interface between Intellectual Property and International Trade:
the TRIPs Agreement, ITALIAN INTELL. PROP. 29 (Jan. 2002); Christopher Wadlow,
“Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods”: The Origins of TRIPs as a GATT Anti-counterfeiting
Code, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 350 (2007).
54. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 899 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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issue. Thus, it is argued that the territoriality principle proscribes such
adjudication. The absence of an “express jurisdictional-stripping
55
statute” in the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements is alleged to
lend further support to this position, since nothing in these treaties
“contemplates or allows one jurisdiction to adjudicate [the] patents of
56
another [country].” In conclusion, this argument purports that the
CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements establish an implicit exclusive
jurisdiction rule with respect to both IPR validity and infringement
disputes.
B. The ECJ (CJEU) GAT Decision
Like the two versions of the first thesis presented, a second thesis
also maintains that implicit exclusive jurisdiction rules exist with respect
to IPRs. However, this thesis differs from the previous in that, firstly,
the exclusive jurisdiction rule covers only registered IPRs and does not
encompass unregistered IPRs; and secondly, the exclusive jurisdiction
rule covers the proceedings related to the validity of the IPR but does
57
not encompass its infringement claims. This thesis forms the basis of
Article 16.4 of the Brussels Convention, now Article 22.4 of the Brussels
58
I Regulation. (Hereinafter, the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I
Regulation are jointly referred to as “the Brussels System” together
59
with the Lugano Convention). Hence, according to the Jenard Report
to the Brussels Convention,
[s]ince the grant of a national patent is an exercise of
national sovereignty, Article 16(4) of the Judgments
Convention provides for exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerned with the validity of patents.
Other actions, including those for infringement of
patents, are governed by the general rules of the
60
Convention.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Lucasfilm, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 [179–180].
57. Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I. Introduction.
58. The Regulation 44/2001, in 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, transformed into a Community legal
instrument (communitarized) the Brussels convention on jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of Sept. 27, 1968.
59. See The Lugano Convention May 30, 2007, concluded between the EC and certain
member States of EFTA: Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and related to jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32007D0712:EN:NOT.
60. 1979 O.J. (C 59) 36. See also Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
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This thesis was also adopted and developed further by the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) in its interpretation of the scope of Article 16.4
of the Brussels Convention (now 22.4 of the Brussels I Regulation) in
two cases. In the first case, the Duijnstee case, Mr. Duijnstee, a
liquidator in the dissolution of a company, applied to the Maastricht
Arrondissementsrechtbank for an interlocutory injunction requiring Mr.
Goderbauer, the former manager of the company, to transfer to Mr.
Duijnstee the patents, both applied for and granted, in twenty-two
countries for an invention that Mr. Goderbauer made while employed
61
by the company. The proceeding came before the Hoge Raad, which
in turn stayed and referred to the ECJ the preliminary question of
“whether the concept of proceedings ‘concerned with the registration or
validity of patents’ within the meaning of Article 16 (4) of the [Brussels]
Convention . . . may cover a dispute such as that concerned in the main
62
action” namely, a dispute having as its subject-matter a transfer of
IPRs. The ECJ answered that Article 16.4 does not cover such
63
disputes.
In the second case, the GAT case, the plaintiff LuK, sued GAT
64
before the Landgericht Düsseldorf.
Here, both the plaintiff and
defendant were companies established in Germany. LuK’s complaint
alleged that GAT had infringed two of LuK’s French patents. GAT
responded by bringing a declaratory action before the Düsseldorf Court,
asking the court to establish that GAT was not in breach of LuK’s
patents, as such patents were either void or invalid.
The
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf stayed the proceeding and asked the ECJ
if the exclusive jurisdiction of Article 16.4 of the Brussels Convention
only applies if proceedings (with erga omnes effect) are
brought to declare the patent invalid or are proceedings
concerned with the validity of patents within the
meaning of the aforementioned provision where the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed in Lugano on 30 October
2007. Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar (Holder of the Chair of International
Law at the University of Milan) in 2009 O.J. (C 319) 25.
61. Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663, ¶ 3.
62. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20.
63. Id. at ¶ 25.
64. Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509, ¶ 10. For further details concerning
this case, see also infra Section VI. Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a Denial of Justice and
Violates the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts.

UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/20/2011 1:06 PM

I.P. RIGHTS AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

371

defendant in a patent infringement action or the claimant
in a declaratory action to establish that a patent is not
infringed pleads that the patent is invalid or void and
that there is also no patent infringement for that reason,
irrespective of whether the court sei[z]ed of the
proceedings considers the plea in objection to be
substantiated or unsubstantiated and of when the plea in
65
objection is raised in the course of proceedings.
The ECJ answered that “the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down [by
Article 16.4 of the Convention] . . . concerns all proceedings relating to
the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue
66
is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection.”
In both the Duijnstee and the GAT cases, the ECJ reached its
conclusions on the basis of the following main arguments. First,
according to the ECJ, “exclusive jurisdiction is justified by the fact that
the issue of patents necessitates the involvement of the national
67
administrative authorities.”
Here, the ECJ references the Jenard
Report, according to which the granting of a patent is an “exercise of
68
national sovereignty.” This statement makes apparent that the Jenard
Report is grounded on the act of State doctrine. Accordingly, the ECJ
decisions citing it are also based on the act of State doctrine.
Furthermore, the act of State doctrine is adopted to ground the
scope of the exclusive jurisdiction rule advanced by the second thesis.
According to this thesis, the exclusive jurisdiction rule covers only
registered IPRs and does not apply to unregistered IPRs. The reason
for this distinction is that registered IPRs are granted through a public
act of concession, which implies the intervention of the national
administration and, therefore, the “exercise of national sovereignty,”
whereas unregistered IPRs come into being without these formalities.
Also, according to this thesis, exclusive jurisdiction rules cover the
69
proceedings related to the validity of IPRs, but do not encompass
related infringement claims. Such divergent treatment is premised on
the argument that proceedings concerning an IPR’s validity actually

65. Id. at ¶ 12.
66. Id. at ¶ 31.
67. Id. at ¶ 23.
68. P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 36.
69. Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I. Introduction.
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question or challenge the validity of its granting acts; whereas
proceedings related to infringement concern only the activity of private
subjects. Thus, since the granting act is an act of the national
administration of the granting State, this act is argued to be an
expression of the State’s sovereignty, leading to the second thesis’
conclusion that validity proceedings imply an examination of the
sovereign activity of foreign States.
In contrast with the ECJ’s embracing of the first argument of the
first thesis, namely, the act of State doctrine, the ECJ has refused to
adopt the second argument of the first thesis, which purports that the
CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements also implicitly establish an
exclusive jurisdiction rule. To understand the ECJ’s position with
regard to the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreements, it is relevant to
briefly review the Tod’s case. In that case, “[h]aving learnt that [a
French company] was offering for sale and selling under [its] name
designs of shoes which copied or at least imitated the principal
70
characteristics of the [Italian companies] Tod’s and Hogan, designs,”
Tod’s brought an action for infringement of registered designs for shoes
71
bearing the Tod’s and Hogan trademarks in the French Court. The
French company countered with a plea of inadmissibility contending
that, under the Berne Convention, Tod’s was not entitled to claim
copyright protection in France for designs that did not qualify for such
72
protection in Italy. The French Court stayed the proceeding and asked
the ECJ to establish if
Article 12 EC, which lays down the general principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, mean that
the right of an author to claim in a Member State the
copyright protection afforded by the law of that State
may not be subject to a distinction based on the country
73
of origin of the work[.]
The ECJ considered that “the purpose of that convention is not to
determine the applicable law on the protection of literary and artistic
works, but to establish, as a general rule, a system of national treatment

70. Case C-28/04, Tod’s SpA, Tod’s France SARL v. Heyraud SA, 2005 E.C.R. I-5783,
¶ 7, available at www.curia.eu.int.
71. Id. at ¶¶ 1–8.
72. Id. at ¶ 8.
73. Id. at ¶ 12.
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Therefore, the ECJ

Article 12 EC . . . must be interpreted as meaning that
the right of an author to claim in a Member State the
copyright protection afforded by the law of that State
may not be subject to a distinguishing criterion based on
75
the country of origin of the work.
The ECJ’s conclusions that the CUB does not relate to private
international law and therefore, does not determine any applicable laws,
but instead establishes that a national treatment principle of a
substantive nature, may be applied to the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs
agreements, and also to international procedural law. Interpreted in
this way, the ECJ’s Tod’s decision determines that the territoriality
principle of the CUP, PCT, and TRIPs agreements not only does not
refer to applicable law, but also does not posit an implicit exclusive
jurisdiction rule.
II. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION RULES ARE NOT ESTABLISHED EITHER
BY COMITY OR BY THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND THE
TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE, BUT RATHER ARE RENDERED ILLEGAL
BY THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES ON THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO COURTS: THE SUBJECT MATTER AND DELIMITATION OF
THIS RESEARCH
The two theses on exclusive jurisdiction just discussed, the first in
the Voda and Lucasfilm cases, and the second in the ECJ judgments, are
not convincing for two reasons. Each reason is related to the
unacceptability of the arguments in their favor when considered in the
context of public international law. The first argument advanced in
support of these theses, based on the act of State doctrine and comity
reasons, respectively, is not convincing for reasons that I will explain
and demonstrate in detail in the second chapter of my forthcoming book
on exclusive jurisdiction in IPRs cases.
For present purposes, I will simply state that IPRs are not an
expression of the sovereignty or local policies of their granting or
76
recognizing States but are “private rights,” albeit where registered,
74. Id. at ¶ 32.
75. Id. at ¶ 37.
76. European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property,
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they come into being with conditions of formalities, namely through an
administrative act. Furthermore, albeit arguendo if these administrative
77
acts were to be considered as acts of State, characterizing them as such
would not impede the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign country over
78
issues concerning the validity thereof, provided that comity reasons
and the act of State doctrine do not rest on general public international
law grounds, that general public international law does not limit a
State’s exercise of jurisdiction inside its borders even with respect to
acts of States, and especially that “there is [even] an infringement of the
right of access to a court where a case is dismissed under the act of state
79
doctrine.” Finally, the adoption of comity reasons in relation to the
international jurisdiction aspects of IPRs was understandable at the
beginning of the IPRs history. Namely, in the so-called “territorial
period,” where an intimate connection between sovereignty, IPRs, and
territory existed; however, the adoption of comity reasons is not
justified today, where the IPRs international and global periods that
followed the territorial period produced the harmonization of the
procedural and substantive laws regarding IPRs, with “a spectacular
80
impact [on, and in] sharp contrast [with,]” the sovereignty (personality
and territoriality) logics.
The second argument advanced in support of these theses that is
grounded on the territoriality principle is not convincing either, for
reasons that I will address in detail in the third chapter of my
forthcoming book.
Accordingly, I simply state here that the
territoriality principle adopted by the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs
agreements does not ground any exclusive jurisdiction rules of an
81
implicit nature, and that, even when the territoriality principle is at the
base of explicit international jurisdiction provisions posed by legal
Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Second Preliminary Draft, 7 (2009),
available
at
http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/draft-clip-principles-06-062009_version_2.pdf. However, the reference to the nature of “private rights” is not present in
the third Preliminary Draft of the CLIP Principles (September 1, 2010), available at
http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/draft-clip-principles-01-09-2010_version_3.pdf.
77. However, on their not being characterized as acts of State see supra note 29.
78. Principally or incidentally raised, see supra Section I. Introduction.
79. As such Tobias Thienel, The Act of State Doctrine: In Violation of International
Law (Part 3), (Oct. 23, 2006) available at http://corelaw.blogspot.com/2006/10/act-of-statedoctrine-in-violation-of.html. See also supra Section I. Introduction, and infra Section VI.
Exclusive Jurisdiction Implies a Denial of Justice and Violates the Fundamental Human Right
of Access to Courts.
80. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 58.
81. On the territoriality principle and on the reasons against its interpretation as a
conflict of jurisdiction provision in relation to IPRs, see the doctrine mentioned supra note 45.
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instruments other than the CUP, CUB, PCT, and TRIPs agreement, the
territoriality principle should be interpreted according to the “proximity
principle,” which cannot be addressed in this paper other than by saying
that such can never ground exclusive jurisdiction rules (as will be
demonstrated in the third chapter of my forthcoming book).
The two theses of exclusive jurisdiction are also not convincing for a
third reason related to public international law. That is, exclusive
jurisdiction rules violate the right of access to courts. This right is
granted by both general international law rules and by international
conventions establishing the avoidance of a denial of justice, the
doctrine (rule) of forum necessitatis, and the fundamental human right
of access to courts. Thus, by violating the right of access to courts,
exclusive jurisdiction provisions violate public international law. This,
in turn, not only does not impose implicit exclusive jurisdiction rules,
but rather, renders them illegal. The demonstration of this conclusion is
the subject matter of this study.
However, this study does not examine private international law
issues related to the contractual circulation of IPR, defined also as
82
“secondary” IPR law.
Rather, this study concentrates on the
“primary” or “proprietary” issues related to IPRs, which comprise
matters of the ownership, validity and existence of such rights as well as
the transferability, scope, and infringement thereof. Hence, exclusive
jurisdiction rules relate to the latter, not the former, matters.
This study presupposes a comparative analysis, which will be
rendered in the first chapter of my forthcoming book, of explicit
exclusive jurisdiction rules of case law and of a statutory nature,
between domestic or conventional origin, and between hard law or soft
83
law character. This study will, then, refer to the specific exclusive
jurisdiction rules only where necessary to demonstrate the herein
proposed conclusion.
Moreover, this study is grounded on the premise, which will be
demonstrated in the first chapter of the forthcoming book, that
exclusive jurisdiction rules are not the expression of a rule of customary
international public law. Here it is sufficient to state that the majority of
States adopt statutory or case law rules concerning exclusive jurisdiction
82. On the EU jurisdiction related to the contractual circulation of IPRs, see Bendetta
Ubertazzi, Licence Agreements Related to IP Rights and the EC Regulation on Jurisdiction, 40
INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 912 (2009) (collecting and construing
resources).
83. On a comparative analysis of the exclusive jurisdiction rules, see the general and
national reports, supra note 1.
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only with respect to validity issues of registered IPRs and only when
such issues are principally raised.
In contrast, these exclusive
jurisdiction rules do not extend to either infringement claims or validity
issues incidentally raised for registered IPRs or to claims related to the
infringement or validity of unregistered IPRs, however raised. Also, the
ALI Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in
84
Transnational Disputes, adopted on May 14, 2007, do not adopt the
model of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Voda v.
Cordis decision but, in contrast, limit the scope of the exclusive
jurisdiction (subject matter jurisdiction) rule to registered IPRs validity
issues principally addressed; however, these principles do not also
extend protection to unregistered IPRs or to registered IPRs
85
incidentally raised validity issues, nor to infringement claims.
The same limited scope of exclusive jurisdiction is adopted by the
CLIP, Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property third
84.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES, (2008). On the ALI Principles, see Kono, Intellectual Property Rights, Conflict of
Laws and International Jurisdiction: Applicability of ALI Principles in Japan, 30 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 865 (2004–2005); Catherine Kessedjian, Current International Development in Choice
of Law: An Analysis of the ALI Draft, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 19 (Basedow, Drexl, Kur & Metzger eds., Tübingen 2005); Alex Metzger, Transfer of
Rights, License Agreements, and Conflict of Laws: Remarks on the Rome Convention of 1980
and the Current ALI Draft, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS n. 61
(Basedow, Drexl, Kur & Metzger eds., Tübingen 2005); Francois Dessemontet, Resolution
Through Conflict of Laws: A European Point of View on the ALI Principles—Intellectual
Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational
Disputes, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 849, 850 (2005); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Resolution Through
Conflict of Laws: The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property Disputes: Why
Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819 (2005); Frank Beckstein, The American Law
Institute Project on Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law,
and Judgments in Transnational Disputes. Summary of the Presentation given by Rochelle
Dreyfuss, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (Stefan
Leible and Ansgar Ohly eds., 2009); Moura Vicente, La propriété intellectuelle en droit
international privé, 335 RECUEIL DES COURS 424 (2008); Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7,
passim (collecting and construing resources); Axel Metzger, Jurisdiction in Cases Concerning
Intellectual Property Infringements on the Internet, Brussels-I-Regulation, ALI-Principles and
Max Planck Proposals, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
251 (Stefan Leible and Ansgar Ohly eds., 2009). See also the doctrine quoted supra note 3.
85. The ALI Principles permit, then, the competent court to adjudicate claims arising
under foreign laws (Article 211.1). Indeed, those principles limit the effectiveness of a court
decision holding invalid the registered rights granted under the law of another State. Hence,
Article 211.2 of the ALI principles states that such a decision shall be effective only between
parties but does not affect the validity or registration of the IP rights in question as against
third parties. The same result is reached under Arts. 213.2 and 213.3 of the ALI principles,
concerning proceedings to obtain a declaration of invalidity of registered IP rights. See Kur
& Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at subsection II. c.
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86

preliminary draft, which was published on September 1, 2010, and by
other academic Principles currently being negotiated in certain Asian
87
countries. Hence, inter alia, the CLIP Principles do not adopt the
model of the ECJ’s GAT decision and establish exclusive jurisdiction
criteria only for disputes related to validity issues principally raised
88
concerning registered IP rights. Moreover, except for the Brussels
Convention, which extended the scope of exclusive jurisdiction
implicitly, and the Lugano Convention, which extended the scope of
89
exclusive jurisdiction explicitly, to registered IPRs validity issues
incidentally raised, exclusive jurisdiction rules concerning IPRs cases
even with a limited scope cannot be found in any other international
conventions. In contrast, the inclusion of such exclusive jurisdiction,
even with a limited scope, in The Hague Draft Convention on

86. See EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, Third Preliminary Draft supra note 76. On the CLIP Principles see Kur &
Ubertazzi, supra note 7 passim; METZGER, Jurisdiction, supra note 84, at 251; De Miguel
Asensio, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Intellectual Property Litigation: The
CLIP Principles, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: JURISDICTION,
APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE
US, (Jurgen Basedow, Toshiyuki Kono, and Axel Metzger eds., 2010) (forthcoming),
available at http://eprints.ucm.es/9841/1/PdeMiguelREC-ENF-CLIP.pdf, at 251; Axel
Metzger, Applicable Law under the CLIP-Principles: A Pragmatic Revaluation of
Territoriality, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: JURISDICTION,
APPLICABLE LAW, AND THE RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE
US, (Jurgen Basedow, Toshiyuki Kono, & Axel Metzger eds., 2010) (forthcoming), available
at
http://www.iri.uni-hannover.de/tl_files/Materialien/Metzger/Publikationen/MetzgerApplicableLawUnderCLIP2010.pdf. See also the doctrine quoted supra note 3.
87. See the Transparency Proposal from Japan, the Waseda Proposal from South-East
Asia, the Korean Proposal from Korea and the MOJ Proposal from Japan, and for all
extensively see Kono & Jurčys, supra note 3, at § I.1.
88. Thus, in disputes having as their object a judgment relating to the grant,
registration, validity, abandonment or revocation of a patent, a mark, an industrial design or
any other IP right protected on the basis of registration, Article 2:401.1 grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts in the State where the IP right was registered or is deemed to have
been registered. In any case, Article 2:401.2, first sentence, clarifies that Article 2:401.1 does
not apply where the validity or registration of the registered IP right is challenged in a context
other than by principal claim or counterclaim. Indeed, Article 2:401.2, second sentence,
establishes that decisions arising from such disputes do not affect the validity or registration
of the IP rights questioned as against third parties. Finally, Article 2:402 on Obligation of
other courts states that “where a court of a state is seized of a claim which has as its object a
matter over which the courts of another state have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article
2:401, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.” It is relevant to remember
that the first Draft of the CLIP principles of April 2009 established an exclusive jurisdiction
also for unregistered IP rights. See Kur & Ubertazzi, supra note 7, at subsection II.c.
89. See the ECJ GAT decision, supra note 7; see Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (l319)
9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 Article 22. 4 of the Lugano Convention.
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international jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments of 1999,
was one of the principal reasons for the failure of that draft. Articles
12.4 and 12.5 of the draft granted exclusive jurisdiction in IP cases to the
courts of the contracting State in which the deposit or registration had
been applied for, had actually taken place, or was deemed to have taken
place, but did not extend it either to copyright and related rights, or to
91
infringement issues, nor to validity issues incidentally raised. Despite
this limited scope, the issue of exclusive jurisdiction grounded in the
provision in question, was extensively debated; since, during the
negotiation proceedings, common law-jurisdiction countries (United
States, England, and Australia) and representatives of business even
92
questioned the overall necessity of exclusive jurisdiction rules.
In this context, it is reasonable to conclude that exclusive jurisdiction
rules are not grounded in the States’ opinio juris ac necessitatis but
90. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters (DHJC), June 18, 1999, with an explanatory report by Peter Nygh &
Fausto Pocar, (HC) Prel. Doc. No. 11, available at (Fausto Pocar & Costanza Honorati eds.,
2005) The Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments: Proceedings
of the Round Table held at Milan University on 15 November 2003, Milan, Cedam, 2005
(Nygh/Pocar Report), p. 209. The text of the DHJC is available ibidem. For the history of
the draft convention and the ensuing developments, see Id. See also Schulz, The Hague
Conference Project for a Global Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement in
Civil and Commercial Matters: An Update, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HEADING FOR THE FUTURE 5 (Josef Drexl & Annette Kur eds.,
2005). With respect to IPRs see Annette Kur, International Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments: A Way Forward for IP? E.I.P.R. 175 (2002); Petkova Svetozara, The
Potential Impact of the Draft Hague Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters on Internet-related Disputes with Particular
Reference to Copyright, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 173 (2004).
91. See Arts.12.4 and 12.5 of the Draft Nygh/Pocar report, supra note 90, at 261; Kono
& Jurčys, supra note 3, at § 4.1.
92. According to those countries, the mere fact of deposit or registration of IPRs
might confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a country which has no jurisdiction over the
defendant (in personam jurisdiction). Permanent Bureau, Preliminary Document No.13,
Report of the experts meeting in the intellectual property aspects of the future Convention on
jurisdiction and foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters (February 1, 2001),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd13.pdf. By contrast, for the Switzerland
and Scandinavian delegations the court of the place of registration has exclusive jurisdiction
over the matters related to validity while courts hearing infringement claims have to stay the
proceeding until the validity issue is decided, see Preliminary Document No.13, at 4–5. For an
overview of all the other delegations’ opinions, see Preliminary Document No.13, at 4–6. See
also Nygh/Pocar report, supra note 90, at 261; Kono & Jurčys, supra note 3, at § 4.1.
According to the reporters of the Draft Convention, then, the definition of the proceedings
related to IPRs was one of the most troublesome questions to address during the negotiation
proceedings of the 1999 Hague draft and was also one of the main reasons why especially the
U.S. delegation opposed to the 1999 leading to its partial failure. See Nygh/Pocar report
supra note 90, at n. 261.
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rather on criticizable political and opportunistic reasons. This statement
is in line with the uncontroversial thesis regarding issues related to the
absolute rights concerning not IP but immovable objects. According to
this thesis, even though certain domestic or conventional norms of a soft
law or a hard law nature allocate international jurisdiction exclusively to
the courts of the State where the immovable object is located, those
norms are not the expression of a rule of customary public international
93
law.
Finally, even though, arguendo, exclusive jurisdiction rules are to be
considered the expression of a rule of customary international public
law, this rule is overridden by another rule of general international
public law, being constituted by the general principle of international
and EU law of forum necessitatis, and of the fundamental human right
94
of access to courts, that will be examined later by this Paper. Hence,
the sovereign reasons found at the basis of allegedly existing exclusive
jurisdiction customary rules cannot prevail over the fundamental human
right of access to courts, which grounds the general legal principle of
forum necessitatis and of the same right of access to courts.
This study does not examine the other possible arguments that are
generally invoked in favor of exclusive jurisdiction rules. However,
some examples of these arguments are (1) that those rules derived from
“the principle of non-justiciability for claims concerning foreign land,
95
established over a century ago in the Moçambique case,” (2) that the
96
same rules promote the “sound administration of justice” and “judicial
97
economy,” (3) that the “best place[] to adjudicate” IP disputes is in the
98
courts of the State that granted or recognized the IP right, and (4) that
93.

See

G.L. TOSATO, LA GIURISDIZIONE VOLONTARIA NEL PROCESSO
(Milano, Giuffrè, 1971).
94.
Hereafter, for the purposes of this Paper only, the general principle of
international and EU law for simplicity will be referred to as general principle of law.
95. Dickinson, supra note 6, at 183. See also Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth,
[2009] EWCA Civ 1328 [174–186], recalling the Moçambique case, and Torremans, supra
note 6, at 753, according to whom the Moçambique case
VOLONTARIO 19

is a case about immovable property, and the argument that intellectual
property is similar to immovable property has really had its day. And in
as far as subject matter jurisdiction is at issue there is simply no way it can
find its way into the [Brussels I] Regulation; the Moçambique case is
irrelevant on this point.
96.
97.
98.

C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509, ¶ 22.
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663, ¶ 22.
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the difficulties of applying in the forum State court the foreign IP law of
99
the State that granted or recognized the IPR are too great.
Accordingly, this study does not expose the arguments against these
reasons since, first, they are not primarily related to international public
law, and, second, they will be examined in the last chapter of my
100
forthcoming book.
This study does not examine whether IPRs validity and infringement
issues or the provisional injunctions related to the IPRs matters can be
arbitrated, notwithstanding the fact that the submission of these issues
to arbitration tribunals and courts that are different than those of the
States that granted the IPR at hand derogates from the exclusive
101
jurisdiction of the courts of the State granting or recognizing the IPR.
Once again, this argument is not related to international public law and
will be examined in the last chapter of the forthcoming book.
This study does not address the issue of the recognition and
102
execution of foreign judgments in IPRs cases. Thus, although it is true

99. See Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
100. Book mentioned at p. 373.
101. On the arbitrability of IPRs validity (inter partes) and infringement issues see
Section II, case 11.4, of each national report on Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Matters of
Intellectual Property, supra note 3. On the competence of the courts different than the courts
of the States that granted the IPR at hand to render provisional injunctions also when the
validity of the litigious IPR is disputed, see the recent decision of the District Court of The
Hague Fort Vale/Pelican, June 18, 2008, according to which the ECJ GAT decision does not
preclude this result. But see also the District Court of The Hague decision of September 15,
2010, that refers questions to the ECJ regarding the applicability to provisional measures of
Article 22.4 of the Brussels I Regulation and of the ECJ GAT decision (NL - Solvay S.A. v.
Honeywell / Referral to Court of Justice EU, Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Fluorine Products
Europe B.V., District Court The Hague, The Netherlands, 15 September 2010, Case No. 092275, available at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/09/nl-solvay-sa-v-honeywellreferral-to-court-of-justice-eu.html#tp (In Dutch).
102. On this issue see the following recent decisions: Case C-38/98, Régie Nationales
des Usines Renault SA v. Maxicar SpA, 2000 E.C.R., available at www.curia.eu; Louis Feraud
Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y 2005); Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf
Inc.,
[2006]
2
S.C.R.
612
(Can.),
available
at
http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2006/2006scc52/2006scc52.html. On those decisions see M.
Trimble Landova, Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
cases of Copyright Infringement, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 654
(2009). See also Kono & Jurčys, supra note 3, at part IV; and the national reports on
Jurisdiction and applicable Law in Matters of Intellectual Property, supra note 3, at the
following: M.C. Janssens for Belgium, Subsection I.II.4; J. Blom for Canada (including
Quebec), subsection II.A.iii; I. Kunda for Croatia, subsection I.D; M.E. Ancel for France,
subsection I.iv; A. Metzger for Germany, subsection I.1.d).(1)-(3); V. Singh for India
Subsection 2.2.10; N. Boschiero and B. Ubertazzi for Italy, subsection I.iv and Subsection II.
case10; D. Yokomizo for Japan, subsection 2.2.10; A. Dias Pereira for Portugal, subsection
I.D; D. Možina for Slovenia, subsection II, case 10; P. De Miguel Asensio for Spain,
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that the allocation of jurisdiction is effective only when the decision
rendered by the competent court is recognized and enforced by the
requested State, the exclusive jurisdiction rules also play a
determinative role at the recognition and enforcement phase. Hence,
on the one hand, the requested State can condition the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments on the fact that the court that
rendered the decision ascertained its jurisdiction on the basis of
international jurisdiction rules similar to those existing in the requested
country which establish an exclusive jurisdiction and therefore that
exclude the court’s competence to address foreign IPRs cases. In other
words, the requested court recognizes and enforces the foreign decision
at stake only if this decision concerns national IPRs of the State that
enacted the decision, i.e., only if this decision was rendered on the basis
of exclusive jurisdiction rules similar to the ones existing in the
103
requested State. On the other hand, the requested State can condition
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on the fact that
such an action does not violate its public policy, which in the specific
case is considered to be integrated by the principle that impedes the
104
adjudication of foreign IPRs issues.
In other words, the requested
court considers the foreign decision at stake compatible with its public
policy, and consequently recognizes and enforces it only if this decision
concerns national IPRs of the State that enacted the decision, i.e., only if
this decision was rendered on the basis of exclusive jurisdiction rules
similar to the ones existing in the requested State. Then, all the
arguments against exclusive jurisdiction addressed here may be
reasonably extended to the issues of recognition and enforcement
themselves, allowing one to conclude that States shall generally
recognize and enforce foreign decisions even when they address their
national IPRs issues. This conclusion is supported not only by all the
arguments against the exclusive jurisdiction rules, which will be listed
below, but also by the view that the fundamental human right of access
to courts is infringed also when the requested State illegally refuses to
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment rendered by a competent
105
court according to its PIL rules.
Finally, this Paper adheres to the prevailing opinion that not only
physical persons but also corporations are entitled to at least certain
subsection 2.3.1-2.
103. See Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328 (Eng.).
104. See Landova, supra note 102, at 642.
105. See HELENE GAUDEMET-TALLON, COMPÉTENCE ET EXÉCUTION
JUGEMENTS EN EUROPE 73 (4th ed., 2010); see also infra .

DES
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fundamental human rights, among which enter the right of access to
106
courts and the right to intellectual property.
III. DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND FORUM NECESSITATIS
A. Denial of Justice
To avoid the denial of justice to aliens and to grant them the right of
access to domestic courts, a general principle of public international law
developed that requires a State to exercise jurisdiction even where it
107
lacks international jurisdiction. This same principle also constitutes a
108
general principle of European Union law.
According to one thesis, States avoid denial of justice simply by
making their judicial systems available to foreigners. This thesis is
inspired by the Calvo Doctrine and has been adopted by many Latin
American States. It is formulated, for instance, by the Salvadorian
Rapporteur, on the topic of State responsibility for the Committee of
Experts, in the Progressive Codification of International Law, which
states that
denial of justice is therefore a refusal to grant foreigners
free access to the Courts instituted in a State for the
discharge of its judicial functions, or the failure to grant
free access, in a particular case, to a foreigner who seeks
to defend his right, although, in the circumstances,
109
nationals of the State would be entitled to such access.
The same opinion was adopted by the Report of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee in 1961, according to which

106. See Rainier Arnold, Are Human Rights Universal and Binding? Limits of
Universalism, (July 2010), THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE
LAW, (forthcoming). See also recently Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) recognizing that corporations have free-speech protections.
107. See PAULSSON J., DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2005);
Francesco Francioni, The Right of Access to Justice under Customary International Law,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 10–11 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) according to
whom in international law access to domestic justice starts to be perceived as a right of aliens
and subsequently develops into a fundamental human right. On the fundamental human
right of access to courts see Section V. The Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts.
On the general principles of law see Giorgio Gaja, General Principles of Law, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 2008).
108. See TRIDIMAS T., THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 370 (2d ed. 2006).
109. See the references in Francioni, supra note 107, at 11.
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the obligation of the State regarding judicial protection
shall be considered as having been fulfilled when it
places at the disposal of foreigners the national Courts
and the legal remedies for implementing their rights.
The State cannot initiate diplomatic claims for the
protection of its nationals nor bring an action before an
international tribunal for this purpose when the means of
resorting to the competent Court of the respective State
110
have been made available.
According to a second thesis, “access to justice is not simply access
to the courts, but the availability of a system of fair and impartial justice,
the effectiveness and legitimacy of which can be reviewed under
111
international standards on the treatment of aliens.”
This second thesis is more in line with the need to grant foreigners
effective judicial protection than is the first thesis. It is codified, for
instance, in Article 9 of the Harvard Draft on State Responsibility for
Injuries to Aliens, according to which
denial of justice exists when there is a denial,
unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to Courts,
gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or
remedial process, failure to provide those guarantees
which are generally considered indispensable to the
proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust
judgment. An error of a national court which does not
112
produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.
To avoid the denial of justice, a domestic court must exercise its
jurisdiction over a claim of an alien where two conditions are met: first,
where the case is linked to the forum State; and second, where no
efficient alternative forum is available from which the applicant may
seek redress. These requirements are also posed by the rule of
jurisdiction by necessity, which constitutes the subject matter of Part B.
of this section of this paper, having a scope analogous to that of the
denial of justice rule, except that it not only concerns aliens but also
110.
111.
112.

See id.
See id.
See id.
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citizens of the forum State.
Thus, the jurisdiction by necessity rule
encompasses the denial of justice rule; therefore, the following analysis
of the former may be extended to the examination of the latter.
B. Forum necessitatis
To avoid denial of justice, not only to aliens but also to citizens,
general public international law requires States lacking international
jurisdiction over a case to nonetheless exercise jurisdiction by necessity
114
by adopting the doctrine or principle of forum necessitatis. Among the
international norms recognizing forum necessitatis is article two of the
Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere
for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, adopted in La
Paz in 1984, which states that
[t]he requirements for jurisdiction in the international
sphere shall also be deemed to be satisfied if, in the
opinion of the judicial or other adjudicatory authority of
the State Party in which the judgment is to be given
effect, the judicial or other adjudicatory authority that
rendered the judgment assumed jurisdiction in order to
avoid a denial of justice because of the absence of a

113.
See TOSATO, supra note 93, at 201–202, n.38 (collecting and construing
resources).
114. In certain common law legal systems, the jurisdiction by necessity or the forum
necessitatis is also referred to as the forum conveniens. “The institution of the forum
conveniens for certain aspects follows the same logic grounding the forum necessitatis in the
civil law countries,” as such Giulia Rossolillo, Forum necessitatis e flessibilità dei criteri di
giurisdizione nel diritto internazionale privato nazionale e dell’Unione europea,
2
DE
DERECHO
TRANSNACIONAL
406
(2010)
available
at
CUADERNOS
http://kusan.uc3m.es/CIAN/index.php/CDT/issue/view/239. See also Michaels, supra note 23,
at 1054. On the forum necessitatis, see also Simon Othenin-Girard, Quelques observations sur
le for de nécessité en droit international privé suisse (Article 3 LDIP), in SCWEIZERISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT 251 (1999); Lycette
Corbion, Le déni de justice en droit international privé, PUAM 202 (2004); Arroyo, supra note
19, at 74; Arnaud Nuyts, Study on Residual Jurisdiction: Review of the Member States’ Rules
concerning the “Residual Jurisdiction” of their courts in Civil and Commercial Matters
pursuant to the Brussels I and II Regulations, September 3rd, 2007, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_residual_jurisdiction_en.pdf, at 64; Valentin
Rétornaz & Bart Volders, Le fort de necessité: tableau comparatif et évolutif, REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 227 (2008); Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, Private
International Law and Comparative Law: A Relationship Challenged by International and
Supranational Law, 11 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 42 (2009); Jeffery Talpis & Gerald Goldstein,
The influence of Swiss law on Quebec’s 1994 codification of private international law, 11 Y.B.
PRIVATE INT’L L. 30 (2009).
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115

competent judicial or other adjudicatory authority.

Among the international soft law norms of an academic origin
establishing forum necessitatis is Article 24 of the European Group for
Private International Law “Proposed Amendment of Regulation
44/2001 in Order to Apply it to External Situations” adopted in Bergen,
Norway on September 21, 2008, according to which
where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under
this Regulation, a person may be sued before the courts
of a Member State with which the claim has a sufficient
connection, especially by reason of the presence of
property in the territory of that State, if the right to a fair
trial so requires, in particular: / (a) if proceedings in a
non-Member State are shown to be impossible; or / (b) if
it could not reasonably be required that the claim should
be brought before a court of a non-Member State; or /
(c) if a judgment given on the claim in a non-Member
State would not be entitled to recognition in the State of
the court seised under the law of that State and such
recognition is necessary to ensure that the rights of the
116
claimant are satisfied.
In the European Union, the doctrine of forum necessitatis was
adopted by a series of rules. Before examining these EU rules, it is
relevant to note that the European Union Commission entrusted
Professor Nuyts of Brussels University to prepare a study on “the
Member States’ rules concerning residual jurisdiction of their Courts in
civil and commercial matters pursuant to the Brussels I and II
117
Regulations.”
This study was delivered on September 3, 2007, and
included a part (Part I.C.16) on forum necessitatis. So, among the EU
norms on the forum necessitatis, Article 7 of the Council Regulation on
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, and enforcement of decisions
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations
115. Inter-American convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, Article 2, May 24, 1984, available at
http://www.oas.org/DIL/CIDIP-III-foreignjudgments.htm.
116. Proposed Amendment of Regulation 44/2201 in Order to Apply it to External
Situations, Article 22 bis, Sept. 21, 2008, available at www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedipdocuments-29EN.htm.
117. See Nuyts, supra note 114, at 64.
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establishes that
[w]here no court of a Member State has jurisdiction
pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6, the courts of a Member
State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if
proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted
or would be impossible in a third State with which the
dispute is closely connected. The dispute must have a
sufficient connection with the Member State of the court
118
seised.
Also, the jurisdiction by necessity rule has been adopted by the
proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation EC 2201/2003,
119
which regulates jurisdiction and applicable law in matrimonial matters.
According to Article 7 of this proposal on “residual jurisdiction,”
where none of the spouses is habitually resident in the
territory of a Member State and do not have a common
nationality of a Member State, or, in the case of the
United Kingdom and Ireland do not have their ‘domicile’
within the territory of one of the latter Member States,
the courts of a Member State are competent by virtue of
the fact that: (a) the spouses had their common previous
habitual residence in the territory of that Member State
for at least three years; or (b) one of the spouses has the
nationality of that Member State, or, in the case of
United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her ‘domicile’ in
120
the territory of one of the latter Member States.

118.

Council Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 of 18 December 2008, Article 7, 2009 O.J. (L

7/8).
119. Commission Staff Working Document, Annex to the proposal for a Council
Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing
rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters SEC (2006) 949 available at
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/divorce/docs/sec_2006_949_en.pdf; Commission Staff Eorking
Document Executive Summary, Impact Assessment for the proposal for a Council Regulation
amending Regulation (EC) no 2201/2003 as regard jurisdiction and introducing rules
concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters SEC (2006) 950 available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2006:0950:FIN:EN:HTML.
120. Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EC) No
2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in
matrimonial matters, COM (2006) 399 final (July 17, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/divorce/docs/sec_2006_949_en.pdf.
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Finally, the forum necessitatis doctrine has also been proposed by the
Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
121
and Commercial Matters.
According to this proposal, it is
“appropriate to create additional jurisdiction grounds for disputes
122
involving third State defendants,” that should find “a balance []
between ensuring access to justice on the one hand and international
123
courtesy on the other hand,” such as the “forum necessitatis, which
would allow proceedings to be brought when there would otherwise be
124
no access to justice” by
ensur[ing] that, where no court of a Member State has
jurisdiction pursuant to the Regulation, the courts of the
Member States may, on an exceptional basis, hear the
case if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or
conducted or would be impossible in a third State with
125
which the dispute is closely connected.
At the domestic level, forum necessitatis has been adopted by both
EU and non-EU member States. Some EU member States have
adopted forum necessitatis through explicit statutory provisions or case
law (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and
the United Kingdom) whereas in the remaining EU Member States
there are currently neither statutes nor case law concerning forum
126
necessitatis.
However, according to professor Nuyts’ study on the
Member States’ residual jurisdiction,
that does not mean that the principle of forum
necessitatis would necessarily be rejected by the court
should a relevant case arise. Some national reporters
expressly note that while there is currently no practice in
121. Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM
(2009) 175 final available at www.europa.eu.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at n. 4.
125. COM(2009) 175 final, [2].
126. Id.
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their country, it could theoretically not be accepted,
under general principle of law, that a party be deprived
of the right of access to a court if this is necessary to
127
vindicate his rights.
Non EU member States adopting forum necessitatis include:
Argentina, Canada (including Quebec), Costa Rica, Japan, Mexico,
128
Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Turkey. Furthermore, even in
the U.S. forum necessitatis has “occasionally been used to rationalize
courts’ decisions,” having been taken into account by the Supreme
129
Court who “has suggested such a basis might be possible.”
Finally,
these EU and non-EU countries already exercise jurisdiction by
necessity, particularly in custody, divorce, succession, and asylum cases,
130
but also in commercial matters.
In general, the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity is conditioned
upon two requirements: (1) the case must have some connection to the
forum State, and (2) it must be unreasonable to bring proceedings
abroad. The first requirement, that the case present “some kind of
131
132
connection with the forum,” poses a proximity condition to avoid
encumbering a particular jurisdiction with the task of correcting all
133
However, this
denials of justice happening around the entire world.
requirement does not exist in the systems of the Netherlands or the
134
United Kingdom, neither of which impose proximity conditions.
Where a proximity condition is required,
there is a general consensus that the required connection
exists at least when the plaintiff is domiciled or habitually
resident in the forum State, or even when he is a citizen
of that State. But any other contacts with the forum
State may be relevant, depending on the circumstances,
such as for instance the presence of assets within the
135
jurisdiction.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Nuyts, supra note 114, at 64.
See forum necessitatis at supra note 114 (collecting and construing resources).
See Michaels, supra note 23, at 1054.
See forum necessitatis at supra note 114.
Nuyts, supra note 114, at 65.
See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 275.
See Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 235.
See Rossolillo, supra note 114, at n.19 (collecting and construing resources).
See Nuyts, Study, supra note 114, at 66. See also Rétornaz and Volders, supra
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The second requirement is that “it is ‘unreasonable,’
‘unacceptable . . . there is an ‘unreasonable difficulty’ to bring
136
proceedings abroad, or . . . the plaintiff ‘cannot be expected’ to do so.”
This second requirement is slightly different than that under EU norms,
which refer only to the unreasonableness of bringing proceedings before
the courts of third States, but not to the unreasonableness of bringing
137
proceedings before the courts of EU member States. However, as will
be demonstrated in Part D of this Section, this limiting of EU norms to
proceedings before non-EU member States shall be overridden by way
of interpretation of those norms, affecting as a result also proceedings
before EU member States. The second requirement is met when there
is a legal obstacle preventing access to the ordinary, competent foreign
court. For instance, if that court will not guarantee a fair trial to the
parties or its decision will not be enforceable in the forum State. Hence,
in this latter situation,
if a decision enacted by a EU member State is not
[recognized] and executed in the requested country, by
virtue of impeding reasons unrelated to its merits (such
as a violation of the right of defen[s]e), the party to
whom the exequatur [sic] has been refused has the right,
in the absence of another competent Court, to raise his
action before a Court of the requested State, albeit this
last Court does not have jurisdiction according to the
Convention or the Regulations: this last Court can
ascertain its jurisdiction recalling the denial of justice
138
according to its domestic laws.

note 114, at 235–240.
136. See Nuyts, Study, supra note 114, at 65.
137. See infra.
138. See GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 105, at 73, according to whom
si une décision venant d’un État communautaire s’est heurté à un refus de
reconnaissance et d’exécution dans l’État requis, refus fondé sur des
motifs étrangers au fond du droit (par exemple, une violation des droits
de la défense), la partie à qui l’exequatur a été refusé aurait le droit, en
l’absence d’autre tribunal compétent, de porter son action au fond devant
un tribunal de l’État requis, pourtant non doté de compétence selon la
convention ou le règlement: ce dernier pourrait se reconnaître compétent
sur la base du déni de justice selon le droit commun du for.
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This thesis addresses cases either already decided or currently pending
before the courts of EU member States, and thus, entering into the
framework of the Brussels system. However, this thesis’ conclusions
may be easily extended, mutatis mutandis, to other cases where, from
the perspective of the forum State, ordinary jurisdiction does not lie
with it but with a court of another non-EU member State that has
already rendered a decision; a decision the forum State either does not
139
recognize or will not enforce.
This second requirement of forum
necessitatis is also met when there is a practical obstacle to effectively
accessing foreign courts. For instance, where “the cost of bringing
proceedings abroad would be ‘out of proportion’ with the financial
140
interests involved in the case.”
In establishing whether the two requirements of forum necessitatis
have been met, it is necessary to proceed on a case-by-case basis, and to
adopt an extensive interpretation of forum necessitatis itself. Thus,
forum necessitatis grants the fundamental human right of access to
141
courts; and therefore, an extensive interpretation of forum necessitatis
favors this fundamental human right. Second, with particular regard to
the first requirement of a connection between the case and the forum
State, “forum necessitatis supposes the absence of another forum in [the
forum State, and thus the] connections with [the forum State] will very
142
rarely have a strict nature.”
The first requirement of forum necessitatis, the existence of a link
between the case and the forum State, raises the question of whether
such a link can be considered present if the relevant international
procedural norms do not support the forum State’s ordinary jurisdiction.
In other words, since international procedural norms generally allocate
ordinary jurisdiction to the courts of the forum State only where a link
exists, could this link be considered as lacking where international
139. This is precisely what happened in Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009]
EWCA (Civ) 1328 (Eng.).
140. See Nuyts, supra note 114, at 65.
141. See Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 261. On the fundamental human
right of access to courts see infra Section V. The Fundamental Human Right of Access to
Courts.
142. As such Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 276 (collecting and construing
resources). See also Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at 234, according to whom “il s’agit
en effet d’évaluer le coût global, et donc pas uniquement monétaire, d’un procès à l’étranger
par rapport à ce qu’on peut exiger du demandeur”, translation: “it is then necessary to
evaluate the global costs, and therefore not only the economic ones, of a foreign proceeding
in relation to what is possible to require from a plaintiff.”
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jurisdiction rules do not underlie the jurisdiction of the forum State’s
courts? For the following reasons the answer to this question must be
no. First, jurisdiction by necessity presupposes the absence of ordinary
international jurisdiction in the forum State; thus, the absence of the
latter does not preclude its adoption. Second, “international practice” is
vast and “shows that . . . the technical argument of lack of jurisdiction
143
has not prevented the finding of a denial of justice.”
Third, this
conclusion is supported by the argument that the requirements of the
forum necessitatis should always be interpreted in an extensive way.
With respect to the second requirement of forum necessitatis, the
unreasonableness of bringing proceedings abroad, the question arises as
to whether a duplication of proceedings can be considered unreasonable.
This question is particularly, but not only, relevant with respect to
European patent litigation, since Article Vd of the Protocol annexed to
the Brussels Convention states that
[w]ithout prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European
Patent Office under the Convention on the grant of
European Patents, signed at Munich on October 5, 1973,
the courts of each Contracting State shall have exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, in proceedings
concerned with the registration or validity of any
144
European patent granted for that State
and since the ECJ rendered the Roche decision and maintained that
Article 6[1] of the Brussels Convention [now Article 6.1
of the Brussels I Regulation according to which a]
defendant domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued:
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the
courts for the place where any one of them is
domiciled . . . must be interpreted as meaning that it does
not apply in European patent infringement proceedings
involving a number of companies established in various
Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or
more of those States even where those companies, which
belong to the same group, may have acted in an identical
or similar manner in accordance with a common policy
143.
144.

Francioni, supra note 107, at 12.
Protocol annexed to the Brussels Convention, Article 5d, 27 Sept. 1968.
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Since neither the patent infringements of which the various defendants
are accused nor the national law in relation to which those acts are
assessed are the same, there is no risk of irreconcilable decisions being
given in European patent infringement proceedings brought in different
contracting States because possible divergences between decisions given
by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of the same
factual and legal situation. Under this framework, the ECJ will have an
opportunity to limit the interpretation of the Roche decision. Hence, on
September 15, 2010, the District Court of The Hague referred to the
ECJ questions concerning the correct interpretation of irreconcilable
decisions in the context of Article 6.1 of the Brussels I Regulation.
Thus, according to the District Court of The Hague, the ECJ Roche
decision was not applicable in the case at hand, as it
concerned a case where the various defendants were
accused only of infringing a patent in the respective
countries where they were situated (so defendant A in
country A; defendant B in country B; etc.), whereas in
the current case, the various defendants were each
accused of infringing a patent in all of the respective
countries that are mentioned in Solvay’s claim for a
cross-border injunction (so defendant A both in country
A and in country B; defendant B both in country A and
146
in country B; etc.).
According to the District Court of The Hague, “in such an event Article
6(1) [Brussels I Regulation] would be applicable as there would be a
147
risk of ‘irreconcilable decisions.’”
Furthermore, the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation
(EC) No. 44/2001 recognizes the need to amend the Regulation in the
sense of allowing a consolidation of proceedings with respect to the
European patents infringements perpetrated by companies belonging to

145. Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535, ¶¶ 5, 41. On
this decision see the doctrine supra note 7.
146. NL-Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe B.V., District Court of
The Hague, The Netherlands, 15 September 2010, Case No. 09-2275.
147. Id.
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the same group. The eventual future restrictive interpretation of the
Roche decision, and the eventual future amendment of the Brussels
Regulation on that point, would not change the need to answer the
question posed here as to whether the duplication of proceedings in
relation to IPRs cases can be considered unreasonable. Hence, the
notion of duplication of proceedings adopted here does not concern
European patents alone, but extends to all other IPRs, it being, mutatis
mutandis, the same as the notion referred to by a recent study
undertaken by Prof. Diemar Harhoff of the University of Munich for
the European Union Commission, delivered on February 26, 2009, and
entitled Economic-Cost Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated
149
European Patent Litigation System. According to this study,
duplication as referred to in this report does not require
that exactly the same legal matter be brought by identical
parties into different national courts. For the purpose of
the [study,] we can speak of duplicated cases if the
introduction of a unified Court would render one or
several of the cases unnecessary, i.e. if the different
national cases are substitutes in a legal and economic
150
sense.
With this clarification in mind, the answer to the current question as
to whether a duplication of proceedings can be considered unreasonable
should be yes, for the following reasons. First, the conclusion that
duplication of proceedings can be considered unreasonable is supported
by the argument that the requirements of forum necessitatis should
always be interpreted in an extensive way. Second, this conclusion is
also supported by the fact that duplication increases litigation costs (and
also may lead to divergent outcomes), rendering them out of proportion
148. Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, at 6, COM (2009) 175 final, available at www.europa.eu.
149. Dietmar Harhoff, Economic Cost-Benefit Anaysis of a Unified and Integrated
European Patent Litigation System, Institute for Innovation Research, Technology
Management
and
Entrepreneurship,
Feb.
29,
2009,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_system_en.pdf.
On this study see Thomas Jaeger, Reto Hilty, Josef Drexl & H. Ullrich, Comments of the Max
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the 2009 Commission
Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified Patent Judiciary, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP.
& COMPETITION L. 818 (2009).
150. Harhoff, supra note 149, at n. 19.
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with the financial interests involved in the case. As already seen, this
circumstance constitutes a practical obstacle to bringing proceedings
abroad, which renders it unreasonable to do so. Third, this conclusion is
confirmed by a recent series of Swiss decisions concerning the
administration of immovable estates located in more than one State,
including the forum State.
In a 1990 decision, the Zurich Obergericht exercised jurisdiction by
necessity over the succession of a U.K. citizen last domiciled in Italy, in
relation to various estates located in different States, including
151
Switzerland and Luxembourg.
In that case, the plaintiff asked the
Zurich Court of First Instance to adjudicate the succession of the Swiss
and Luxembourg estates. The requested court declined its competence
on the grounds that Swiss international procedural law conferred only
international jurisdiction to the Swiss Courts in succession matters
where the de cuius was last domiciled in Switzerland, whereas in the
case before the court the de cuius was last domiciled in Italy. However,
the Zurich Court of Second Instance reversed the decision, on the
grounds that the courts that would have ordinarily been competent to
hear the case could not have addressed it in its entirety. That is, the
courts of the State where the de cuius was last domiciled, Italy, were not
competent to address the succession issues related to the estates located
abroad, while, analogously, the courts of the State of the de cuius’
nationality, the U.K. Courts, were not competent to adjudicate the
matters related to the “foreign” estates, and the courts of the State
where the estates were located, i.e., Luxembourg, were competent to
address only the issues related to their local estates. Thus, the Zurich
Court of Second Instance concluded that requiring the plaintiff to raise
proceedings in the United Kingdom, Italian, Luxembourg, and Swiss
Courts would have been unreasonable, and established its jurisdiction
by necessity over the succession of both the Swiss and Luxembourg
estates.
This same result was reached in a subsequent case also rendered by
152
the Zurich Obergericht in 1992. The plaintiffs in that case asked the
Swiss Court of First Instance to adjudicate the succession of an Iraqi
citizen last domiciled in London, with regard to various estates located
in Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The requested court declined its

151. See Obergericht ZH, Feb. 2, 1990, ZR 89 (1990), n. 4, p.7 (Swi.). On this decision
see Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 283.
152. See Obergericht ZH, Feb. 26, 1992, ZR 90 (1991), n. 89, p.289 (Swi.). On this
decision see Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 284.
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competence on the grounds that the de cuius was last domiciled in
London not in Switzerland. However, the Zurich Court of Second
Instance reversed the decision, finding that, firstly, it was unnecessary to
establish the international jurisdiction of the Iraqi Courts since the de
cuius was a refugee in the United Kingdom, and, according to the Swiss
international jurisdiction rules (Article 24.3), where these rules refer to
citizenship, in cases of refugees they shall be interpreted as designating
the domicile. Secondly, the U.K. Courts ordinarily competent to hear
the case could not have addressed it in its entirety, since they could not
have adjudicated the issues related to the estates in Switzerland and
Liechtenstein. Thus, the Zurich Court of Second Instance concluded
that requiring the plaintiff to raise proceedings before both the U.K.
and Swiss Courts would have been unreasonable, and thereby
established its jurisdiction by necessity over the succession of both the
Swiss estates and those located abroad.
In sum, both of the preceding disputes were such that the courts of
no single State had the ordinary jurisdiction to address them in their
entirety, thereby requiring the plaintiff to otherwise start several “local”
proceedings before the courts of each State where the estates were
located. In such a context, the courts of the forum State considered the
bringing of so many proceedings before so many different courts to be
unreasonable, and thereby determined that the duplication of
153
proceedings met the second requirement of forum necessitatis.
It
should also be noted that these adjudications also met the first
requirement of the doctrine of forum necessitatis, in that the cases were
linked to the forum State at least by the presence of estates in
Switzerland.
C. Sources of Law Hierarchy
Another question that arises is whether the international, EU, and
domestic rules on forum necessitatis are expressions of or constitute a
154
general principle of law.
This question should be answered in the
affirmative for at least the following reasons. First, since the avoidance
of the denial of justice is a general principle of law, and forum
necessitatis aims at avoiding the denial of justice, the former should have
the same legal nature as the latter. Moreover, although forum
necessitatis extends the scope of the rule of avoidance of the denial of
justice, in that it concerns not only aliens but citizens alike, this
153.
154.

See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 283–284.
See Gaja, supra note 107.
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difference does not change the conclusion just reached. Forum
necessitatis avoids not only the denial of justice, but also discrimination
between citizens and aliens in the exercise of the right of access to
courts, and the avoidance of discrimination and the right of access to
courts are fundamental human rights and, as such, constitute general
principles of law. It thereby follows that forum necessitatis should have
the same juridical nature as these general principles of law.
Second, the conclusion that forum necessitatis constitutes a general
principle of law is supported by the fact that the international, EU, and
municipal rules establishing it generally take the same approach to this
notion, creating a genuine common denominator, namely the two
requirements of proximity to the forum State and the unreasonableness
of litigating before the ordinary competent court. Since the existence of
a genuine common denominator among rules is one possible criterion
155
for the construction of a general principle of law, it is reasonable to
conclude that forum necessitatis constitutes a general principle of law.
Third, this conclusion is not deniable just because two of the
municipal rules concerning forum necessitatis permit its adoption
without imposing a proximity requirement, or because EU norms limit
its adoption to cases where the ordinary competent court is in a non-EU
member State. The two municipal rules that do not establish a
proximity requirement do increase the scope of the forum necessitatis,
but do so without compromising the genuine common denominator
between all the other rules, which are more rigorous in that they impose
the proximity condition. The same can be said with regard to the EU
norms that limit the adoption of forum necessitatis to cases where the
ordinary competent court is in a non-EU member State. While it is true
that the EU rules limit rather than increase the scope of forum
necessitates, this limitation does not compromise the genuine common
denominator between all the other rules, which are more liberal in that
they do not distinguish between the EU external or internal location of
the ordinary competent court. Moreover, as will be demonstrated later
in this section, although the EU norms explicitly refer to cases where
the ordinary competent court is of a non-EU member State, they should
be interpreted as also allowing the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity
when the ordinary competent court is in an EU member country.
Fourth, this conclusion is supported by the Nuyts’ study
commissioned by the EU, according to which forum necessitatis is a

155.

Id. at 30.
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“general principle of public international law.”
The characterization of forum necessitatis as a general principle of
157
law leads to the following conclusions.
From a primary law
158
coordination of norms and hierarchical perspective, forum necessitatis
has direct effect in the EU and in the internal legal systems, and prevails
over domestic rules, EU secondary norms, and international
conventions. This is because
[o]ne cannot assume that treaty rules always prevail over
general principles of law. This would normally be the
case when the treaty and the general principle cover the
same ground. However, a general principle could also
affect the way in which a certain treaty rule is to be
applied. It could impinge on the application of the treaty
rule under limited aspects. In that case it would be more
159
appropriate to say that the principle prevails.
Therefore, the municipal norms that do not contemplate forum
necessitatis should be interpreted by the domestic courts as not impeding
160
its adoption. Accordingly, the European Union provisions that do not
contemplate or that exclude forum necessitatis should either be
interpreted by the domestic courts of the EU member States as not
impeding the adoption thereof, or simply should not be applied by those
domestic courts, or should be declared partially invalid by the ECJ on

156. See Nuyts, supra note 114, at 64. See also Rétornaz & Volders, supra note 114, at
229, according to whom “le for de nécessité découle d’un principe général interdisant les
dénis de justice.” Translation: “the jurisdiction by necessity forum arises out of a general
principle that imposes to avoid the denial of justice.”
157. With the term primary law, this Section refers to Part I of the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26. U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.4/SER/A/2001
[hereinafter
Draft
Articles],
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf, on “[t]he
internationally wrongful act of a State [that] deals with the requirements for the international
responsibility of a State to arise.” Id. at 32.
158. For a comparative perspective on the “hierarchy” of the sources of international
law in the different national legal systems involved: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Bulgaria,
Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Serbia,
Slovakia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela, see Dinah Shelton,
International Law in Domestic Systems (July 2010) in THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, § 10 (forthcoming).
159. See generally Gaja, supra note 107, at 22.
160. Id.
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grounds of ”infringement of the [EU] Treaties or of any rule of law
161
relating to their application[,]” as they are general principles of law or,
depending on the circumstances of the case, through a proceeding to
review the legality of the norms under Article 263 of the Lisbon Treaty
162
or through a preliminary ruling under Article 267.
Finally, the international treaties that do not contemplate or exclude
forum necessitatis should either be interpreted by the domestic courts of
the party States as indeed allowing the doctrine’s adoption or should not
be applied where they exclude forum necessitatis. It is true that
inconsistency with a general principle of law does not generally
163
invalidate a treaty; however, since forum necessitatis is a general
principle of law, it can be considered by a domestic court as prevailing
over the implied treaty rule, and thus impinging on the application of
the treaty rule, thereby allowing access to the court.
D. EU Brussels System
Another question that arises is whether forum necessitatis also
applies to cases falling within the scope of international conventions or
EU norms that establish international jurisdiction rules, but do so
without explicitly including a jurisdiction by necessity provision. The
Brussels System, in particular, will be examined below. In answering
164
this question, it is relevant to examine the ECJ’s Owusu decision.
165
While this decision addresses forum non conveniens, rather than
166
forum necessitatis, according to one thesis, it applies also with respect
to the latter. In the Owusu case, the plaintiff, a British national
domiciled in the United Kingdom, suffered an accident while on
vacation in Jamaica and subsequently brought in the United Kingdom
both an action for breach of contract against the person, as the
individual that rented him the villa in Jamaica where the accident
occurred was also domiciled in the United Kingdom, and an action in
tort against several Jamaican companies responsible for the villa’s

161. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(Lisbon Treaty), art. 263 (ex art. 230 TEC), Mar. 25, 1957.
162. Id. at Article 267 (ex Article 234 TEC).
163. Save where the general principle of law expresses a jus cogens rule, see Treaties
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”), of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of treaties, art. 53, done at Vienna May 23, 1969, entered into force
on Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 United Nations, Treaty Series, 331.
164. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383.
165. On the forum non conveniens notion see Section 4, Part D, EU Brussels System.
166. See Rossolillo, supra note 114, at 412.

UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/20/2011 1:06 PM

I.P. RIGHTS AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

399

167

management, upkeep and control.
The defendants argued that the
courts best positioned to hear the case were the Jamaican Courts, as
168
Accordingly, the defendants asked the
opposed to the U.K. Courts.
U.K. Court to decline its jurisdiction in the name of forum non
169
conveniens. In the United Kingdom, this doctrine establishes that
a national Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on
the ground that a court in another State, which also has
jurisdiction, would objectively be a more appropriate
forum for the trial of the action, that is to say, a forum in
which the case may be tried more suitably for the
170
interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.
In response to the motion and prayer request, the U.K. Court
referred an interlocutory question to the ECJ asking it to establish
whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens (hereinafter the forum
non conveniens) could be applied within the framework of the Brussels
Convention, since the convention did not explicitly make reference to
171
it.
The ECJ answered that the doctrine could not apply, citing the
172
First, based on a literal interpretation of the
following arguments.
Brussels Convention, the convention does not allow any derogation
173
from the principles it lays down. Second, the ECJ argument relied on
a historical interpretation of the Brussels Convention, according to
which
[i]t is common ground that no exception on the basis of
the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided for by
the authors of the Convention, although the question was
167. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383, ¶¶ 10–12.
168. Id. at ¶ 15.
169. Id. at ¶ 15.
170. Id at ¶ 8 (citing Spiliada Mar. Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1986] A.C. 460 (H.L.) 476.)
On the relationship between the forum non conveniens and the Brussels Convention before
the ECJ Owusu decision see Gardella & Brozolo, supra note 23, at 620; and after the Owusu
decision see Barry J. Rodger, Forum non conveniens post-Owusu, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 71
(2006). See also the resolution of the Institut de Droit International, The principles for
determining when the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and anti-suit injunctions is
appropriate, Rapporteur Sir Lawrence Collins, Session de Bruges (Feb. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2003_bru_01_en.PDF.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at ¶ 37.
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discussed when the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the
Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
was drawn up, as is apparent from the report on that
174
Convention by Professor Schlosser.
Third, the ECJ argument was based on a teleological interpretation of
the Brussels Convention, which stated that while
[r]espect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one
of the objectives of the Brussels Convention (see inter
alia, Case C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde and Others
[1999] ECR I-6307, paragraph 23, and Case C-256/00
Besix [2002] ECR I-1699, paragraph 24), would not be
fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the
Convention had to be allowed to apply the forum non
175
conveniens doctrine

allowing forum non conveniens in the context of the
Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the
uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained
therein in so far as that doctrine is recogni[z]ed only in a
limited number of Contracting States, whereas the
objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay
down common rules to the exclusion of derogating
176
national rules.
Fourth, the ECJ argument based on an ab inconvenienti interpretation
of the Convention was that forum non conveniens would undermine the
177
“legal protection of persons established in the Community . . . .”
Hence, the ECJ concluded that

174.
Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 ¶ 37 (referencing
Peter Schlosser, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION on the Association of the Kingdom of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, 1979 O.J. C 59, 71 ¶¶ 77–78).
175. Id. at ¶ 38.
176. Id. at ¶ 43.
177. Id. at ¶ 42.
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[f]irst, a defendant, who is generally better placed to
conduct his defen[s]e before the courts of his domicile,
would not be able . . . reasonably to foresee before which
other court he may be sued. Second, where a plea is
raised on the basis that a foreign court is a more
appropriate forum to try the action, it is for the claimant
to establish that he will not be able to obtain justice
before that foreign court or, if the court sei[z]ed decides
to allow the plea, that the foreign court has in fact no
jurisdiction to try the action or that the claimant does
not, in practice, have access to effective justice before
that court, irrespective of the cost entailed by the
bringing of a fresh action before a court of another State
178
and the prolongation of the procedural time-limits.
It is therefore important to establish whether the arguments
grounding the Owusu decision may be extended from the context of
forum non conveniens to that of forum necessitatis. To this end, a first
thesis has determined that there are four possible groups of cases, of
which the Owusu decision does not apply to three of them such that
179
forum necessitatis can thus be adopted in those three groups of cases.
In the first group of cases established by this thesis, international
jurisdiction is allocated under the Brussels System to the courts of a
non-member State. In those cases, this thesis determines that the
Owusu decision does not preclude the member States’ courts from
applying forum necessitatis. On one hand, this conclusion is based on
the “unilateral perspective” of the Brussels System, which privileges the
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of member States over the courts of
non-member States. On the other hand, the conclusion is based on the
differences between forum non conveniens and forum necessitatis. The
latter provides the forum court with jurisdiction that would otherwise
not exist, whereas the former deprives the forum court of jurisdiction
that otherwise does exist. Thus, forum non conveniens can lead to the
denial of justice, whereas forum necessitatis, by its nature, avoids such a
denial. In addition, the Owusu decision was aimed at safeguarding the
“legal protection of the persons established in the [territory]” covered
180
by the Brussels System. Therefore, transferring proceedings, by virtue
178.
179.
180.

Id. at ¶ 42.
See Rossolillo, supra note 114, at 417.
Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 ¶ 2.
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of forum non conveniens, to the courts of a non-member State would
deprive the persons established in the territory, and thereby covered by
the Brussels System, of its procedural and substantive standard of
protection and of its regime of free circulation of decisions. In contrast,
however, forum necessitatis implies the exercise of jurisdiction by the
forum court of a member State, and is therefore in line with the system
and standards established by the Brussels System to safeguard those
aforementioned procedural and substantive rights.
In the second group of cases delineated by this thesis, under the
Brussels System, international jurisdiction is allocated to the courts of
an EU member State other than that of the forum, but the courts of the
forum State are permitted to exercise jurisdiction by necessity either
because the other member State’s decision will be unenforceable in the
forum State’s courts for reasons of public policy, or because fortuitous
or force majeure circumstances, such as a war or an earthquake, impede
the plaintiff from bringing the proceedings before the ordinarily
competent court. According to this thesis, in such cases the exercise of
jurisdiction by necessity does not imply an evaluation of the legal system
of the State with ordinary jurisdiction. Thus, the Owusu decision does
not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity. This conclusion is
based, mutatis mutandis, on the reasons set forth with respect to the first
group of cases examined.
In the third group of cases established by this thesis, international
jurisdiction is allocated under the Brussels System to the courts of a
member State, but the forum State is permitted to exercise its
jurisdiction by necessity due to the need to grant the plaintiff certain
rights not recognized by the legal system of the State with ordinary
competence, such as the right to contract a same-sex marriage. Here, the
exercise of jurisdiction by necessity implies an evaluation of the legal
system of another member State. Yet, in these cases, this thesis holds
that the Owusu decision does not preclude such jurisdiction. On the
one hand, this conclusion is based on the need to safeguard the rights in
question, such as the right to contract a same-sex marriage. On the
other hand, this conclusion is based, mutatis mutandis, on the reasons set
forth with respect to the first group of cases examined.
Finally, in the fourth group of cases established by this thesis,
international jurisdiction is allocated under the Brussels System to the
courts of a member State, but the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity is
not permitted since it is grounded on reasons such as excessive time or
cost of proceeding before the “ordinary” competent court. In those
cases, this thesis holds that such an exercise of jurisdiction implies an
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evaluation of the legal system of the State with ordinary jurisdiction.
The thesis thereby holds that in those cases the Owusu decision
precludes the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity. This conclusion is
grounded not on the differences but rather on the similarities between
the forum non conveniens and the forum necessitatis, namely, that they
both provide domestic courts with great discretionary power to establish
on a case-by-case basis whether it is appropriate to exercise jurisdiction,
and that excluding the adoption of forum non conveniens and forum
necessitatis only when the ordinary competent court is located in a EU
member State implies an obligation of mutual trust between member
181
States, which is the concept that lay at the base of the Brussels System.
The conclusions of this first thesis are convincing in relation to the
first three groups of cases proposed by it, specifically the groups of cases
that exclude the application of the ECJ Owusu decision to forum
necessitatis. However, it seems to me that the arguments on which this
thesis grounds its conclusions are not convincing. Also, other reasons
exist on the basis of which one may conclude that forum necessitatis is
always applicable no matter the peculiarities of the case involved, such
that the distinction among the different groups of cases is unnecessary.
The arguments raised by this thesis are unconvincing for the
following three reasons. First, on the one hand, this thesis does not
permit the adoption of forum necessitatis when, as in the fourth group of
cases, ordinary jurisdiction belongs to another member State and the
forum’s exercise of jurisdiction would imply an evaluation of the other
State’s system. Yet, on the other hand, when as with the third group of
cases, institutions are involved that are unknown to the State with
ordinary jurisdiction, such as same-sex marriage, this thesis allows the
forum State to exercise jurisdiction by necessity notwithstanding the fact
that ordinary jurisdiction belongs to another member State, and that
such an exercise of jurisdiction implies an evaluation of the other State’s
legal system. Furthermore, this thesis justifies disparate treatment on
the grounds that only the latter cases implicate rights deserving special
protection. Here, the weakness of this thesis’ logic lies in its failure to
recognize that both the former and the latter cases relate to the right of
access to courts, which as a fundamental human right also deserves
special protection.
181. See Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; Case C-116/02,
Gasser v. MISAT, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693, on both of which in relation to the obligation of
mutual trust, see Rossolillo, supra note 114, at 417; Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Choice of
Court and Arbitration Agreements and the Review of the Brussels I Regulation, 30 PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENS-RECHTS [IPRAX] 121 (2010).
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Second, this thesis contradicts itself. It allows the exercise of
jurisdiction by necessity when, as in the second group of cases, the
decision of the court of ordinary competence would be contrary to the
public policy of, and thus unenforceable in, the forum State, while at the
same time, it proscribes such jurisdiction when, as in the fourth group of
cases, bringing a proceeding before the court of ordinary competence
would entail excessive time or cost. However, since the excessive time
or cost of a proceeding renders a judgment contrary to Article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature by the member States of
the Council of Europe in Rome on November 4, 1950 (ECHR) and
thus, contrary to the public policy of the forum member State, it is
therefore also unenforceable in the forum State.
Third, this thesis first emphasizes the differences between forum
necessitatis and forum non conveniens, then suggests an application to
the former of the Owusu decision related to the latter, then
subsequently highlights the similarities between forum non conveniens
and forum necessitatis, and then finally suggests an application to the
latter of the Owusu decision related to the former. Thus, this thesis is
not linear, as well as being excessively complicated.
In contrast, the thesis proposed here maintains that forum
necessitatis can always be adopted, even within the framework of
international conventions that do not explicitly mention it, for the
following eight reasons. First, a coordination of the norms and
hierarchical interpretation of the Brussels System and forum necessitiatis
highlights that the latter constitutes a general principle of law and as
such prevails over the Brussels System. Second, a literal interpretation
of the Brussels System indicates that it does not explicitly impede
application of forum necessitatis. Third, a teleological and systematic
interpretation of the Brussels System and the norms concerning
fundamental human rights indicates that, since the fundamental human
right of access to courts is at the basis of the forum necessitatis, the
Brussels System must be interpreted as operating in a sense favorable
to, and as ultimately adopting, forum necessitatis. Fourth, a teleological
and systematic interpretation of the Brussels System and the norms of
fundamental human rights also highlights that the obligation of mutual
trust and the need for legal certainty cannot prevail over the
fundamental human right of access to courts. This conclusion is in line
with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), according to which member States of the ECHR violate its
Article 6 provision even when they limit the applicant’s right of access
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to courts to give effect to the rules of an international agreement, such
as the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. Furthermore, as will be
demonstrated by the following remarks, the same conclusions apply
with respect to EU norms such as the Brussels I Regulation, despite the
peculiarities of the relation between the ECHR and the European
Union. Fifth, a teleological interpretation of the Brussels System
emphasizes that even in the presence of such a system
the risk of a negative conflict of competence is never
totally inexistent; it is never possible to exclude that the
sei[z]ing of the Courts of a member State which is
exclusively competent with respect to the [Brussel
System] happens to be impossible for the plaintiff, and
183
therefore that he suffers a denial of justice.
Indeed, the Brussels System “aims at improving the condition of the
persons involved and not at depriving them of an accessible Court when
they suffer a denial of justice by reason of a malfunction of a mechanism
184
instituted by an international instrument.” Thus, the existence of the
Brussels System cannot preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by
necessity. Sixth, a historical interpretation of the Brussels System
demonstrates that, during its adoption, no discussion with respect to
forum necessitatis occurred. Thus, no argument precluding the exercise
of jurisdiction by necessity can be derived from its legislative history.
Seventh, the thesis proposed here is supported by current States’
practice, which already applied forum necessitatis to cases falling within
the scope of the Brussels System, even when ordinary jurisdiction
belonged to the courts of another member State. Eighth, the thesis
proffered here is not contradicted by the ECJ Owusu decision. Hence,
this decision does not explicitly concern the forum necessitatis.
Additionally, as already mentioned, forum non conveniens deprives a
forum court of jurisdiction that otherwise exists, as such bringing

182. See infra.
183. See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 266, “le risque d’un conflit négatif de
compétence n’est jamais totalement inexistant; on ne peut jamais exclure que la saisine des
juridictions d’un Etat contractant exclusivement compétent au regard de la convention se
révèle impossible pour le demandeur, et que celui-ci subisse un déni de justice.” See also
GAUDEMET-TALLON, supra note 105, at 73.
184. See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 267, “pour fonction d’améliorer le sort des
justiciables et non de les priver d’un for lorsqu’elles subissent un déni de justice en raison du
mauvais fonctionnement des mécanismes instaurés par l’instrument international.”

UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

406

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 1:06 PM

[Vol. 15:2

jurisdiction outside the European Union, whereas forum necessitatis
provides the EU Courts with jurisdiction that would otherwise not exist
and, therefore, is in line with the need to safeguard the “legal protection
185
of the persons established in the [territory]” covered by the Brussels
System. Then, unlike forum non conveniens, the legislative history of
the Brussels Convention does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction
by necessity. Finally, mutatis mutandis, the aforementioned reasons
lead to the conclusion that while the aforementioned EU norms
explicitly contemplate forum necessitatis only with respect to cases
belonging to the ordinary jurisdiction of non-EU member States,
jurisdiction by necessity can still be exercised in relation to cases
pertaining to the ordinary jurisdiction of EU member countries.
E. Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Brussels System
Another question arises as to whether forum necessitatis also applies
to cases falling within the Brussels System’s exclusive jurisdiction
provisions. The answer to this question should be in the affirmative, for
the following reasons.
The first recalls all the reasons in favor of the adoption of forum
necessitatis within the framework of the Brussels System, which reasons,
mutatis mutandis, apply even when ordinary jurisdiction belongs
exclusively to a court outside of the forum State.
The second argument recognizes that exclusive jurisdiction
provisions can easily lead to the denial of justice, and consequently
emphasizes that their presence further obliges the adoption of forum
necessitatis. For example, bringing a case before the courts of a member
State that, according to the Brussels System are exclusively competent
with respect to this case, may be impossible for the plaintiff, with the
consequence that if no other forum has jurisdiction to examine the case,
186
the plaintiff suffers a denial of justice.
The third argument emphasizes that, save the just cited thesis, which
maintains that exclusive jurisdiction provisions render the adoption of
forum necessitatis all the more necessary, none of the other studies that I
examined address differently the exclusive jurisdiction provisions from
all other international jurisdiction norms as far as forum necessitatis is
concerned. Thus, the conclusions reached with respect to the latter, to
the effect that forum necessitatis must be adopted even within the
framework of the Brussels System, should also apply with respect to the
185.
186.

Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383 ¶ 2.
See Othenin-Girard, supra note 114, at 266.
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former, thereby establishing that jurisdiction by necessity must be
exercised within the framework of the Brussels System even in cases
falling within their exclusive jurisdiction provisions.
The fourth argument is based on the thesis proposed here, which
asserts that exclusive jurisdiction provisions are contrary to public
international law; as such, they are thereby illegal and should be
overruled from a de lege ferenda perspective, whereas from a de lege lata
perspective these rules cannot derogate from or prevail over the rule of
forum necessitatis.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS
A. Right of Access to Courts
Public international law grants, to both aliens and citizens alike, the
187
fundamental human right of access to courts.
Among the universal
international norms regarding the right of access to court are: Article 8
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December
10, 1948, by the General Assembly of the United Nations and Article
2.3 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, adopted
188
by the same General Assembly on December 16, 1966.
Among the
regional international norms regarding the right of access to courts are:
Article 6.1 of the ECHR and Article 8 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, adopted at San José, Costa Rica on November 22,
189
1969.
With respect to the European Union, the right of access to courts is
granted by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, adopted at Nice on December 7, 2000 (Charter of
Nice), which is referenced by Article 6.1 of the Treaty of Lisbon
187. On the impact of the fundamental human right of access to a court (due process)
on the issue of international jurisdiction, see MATSCHER F., IPR und IZVR vor den Organen
der EMRK – Eine Skizze, in BARFUSS W., DUTOIT B., FORKEL H., IMMENGA U. and
MAJOROS F. (eds.), Festschrift für Karl H. Neumayer zum 65. Geburtstag 459 (Nomos,
Baden-Baden, 1985); PETER SCHLOSSER, Jurisdiction in International Litigation—The Issue
of Human Rights in Relation to National Law and to the Brussels Convention, LXXIV
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 5 (1991); Guinchard E., Procès equitable (article 6
CESDH) et droit international privé, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE AND
RELATIONS WITH THIRD STATES 199, n. 22 (NUYTS A. & WATTÉ N. eds., 2005); James
Fawcett, The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law, 56 INT’L
COMP. L.Q. 1, nn. 6, 36 (2007); FABIEN MARCHADIER, LES OBJECTIFS GÉNÉRAUX DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ À L’ÉPREUVE DE LA CONVENTION DES DROITS DE L’HOMME
37 (Bruylant ed. 2007). See also the doctrine referred to at note 18.
188. See for all Francioni, note 107, at 24.
189. Id.
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amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
190
the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.
According to that treaty, “[t]he Union recognizes the rights, freedoms
and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12
December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the
191
Treaties.”
Furthermore, Article 6.3 of the same Treaty states that
“[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
192
States shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.” Finally,
according to Article 6.2 of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union
“the Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection
193
of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”
The fundamental right of access to courts is domestically established
by several EU member States, namely, Austria, Finland, Germany,
194
Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands.
This right is also domestically
established by several non-EU member States, namely, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa,
195
Switzerland, and Turkey. Furthermore, although “U.S. law does not
196
endorse an explicit general right of access to court[s],” such a right
constitutes the “European equivalent of the American constitutional
197
guarantee of due process,” and can be found “indirectly in two other
198
doctrines,” namely, jurisdiction by necessity and the duty of courts to
exercise the jurisdiction they have been given by the legislature.
The proceeding remarks relate, in particular, to the fundamental
human right of access to courts as established by Article 6 of the ECHR
and as interpreted by the ECtHR inter alia because of its place within
190. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007 O.J. C
306/01.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. See Protocol relating to Article 6(2) on the Treaty on the European Union on
the accession of the Union to the European Convention from the Protection of the Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2007 O.J. C 306/01, at 155.
194. See http://confinder.richmond.edu/.
195. Id.
196. Michaels, supra note 23, at 1053.
197. As such Guinchard E., supra note 187, at 199. See also Nuyts, supra note 23, at
157; Michaels, supra note 23, at 1054.
198. Michaels, supra note 23, at 1053.
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the European Convention of Human Rights, which is considered to be
the most advanced international system for the protection of
fundamental human rights. According to Article 6 of the ECHR, “in
the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
199
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Thus, Article
6 does not expressly guarantee the right of access to courts. However,
decisions of the ECtHR have established that the denial of access to
200
domestic courts can amount to a breach of Article 6.
From a primary law coordination of norms and hierarchical
perspective, the question arises as to whether Article 6 of the ECHR
gives rise to a general principle of international or European law
(hereinafter: general principle of law). The answer to this question is
yes, for the following reasons. First, the characterization as a general
principle of EU law of the fundamental human rights established by the
ECHR and emanating from the shared constitutional traditions of the
Member States, such as the right of access to courts, is explicitly
rendered by Article 6.3 TEU and by relevant ECJ case law. Second, the
right of access to courts can be characterized as a general principle of
international public law, mutatis mutandis, for the same reasons,
according to which forum necessitatis is also a general principle of law.
Third as a general principle of public international law and of EU law,
the right of access to courts has a direct effect and prevails over
201
domestic rules, EU secondary norms, and international conventions.
From a content perspective, Article 6 of the ECHR imposes on its
member States a non-horizontal, positive, and procedural obligation of
202
result.
This obligation is non-horizontal because it does not aim at
199. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols
Nos. 3,5,8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20 1971, Jan. 1 1990, and
Nov. 1 1998 respectively.
200. The first decision was taken by the ECtHR in Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur.
Ct. H.R. Application No. 4451/70, ¶¶ 28, 31 (1975), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. See
David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Edward Bates & Carla Buckley, HARRIS, O’BOYLE &
WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 235 (2nd ed. 2009)
according to whom this decision was “one of the most creative steps taken by the European
Court in its interpretation of any article of the Convention.”
201. See supra, the remarks rendered with regard to the forum necessitatis as a general
principle of law.
202. See Cordula Dröge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen
Menschenrechtskonvention, in BEITRÄGE ZUM AUSLÄNDISCHEN ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT
VÖLKERRECHT
159,
380
(2003),
available
at
UND
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/beitr159.pdf.
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protecting the rights-holder against interference by another private
203
party, but rather from interference by the State itself. This obligation
204
is positive because it does not require that States “refrain from acting”
but rather requires that they take positive actions to facilitate the
fundamental human right of access to courts. The obligation is
procedural because it operates at the procedural level, rather than at the
205
substantive level, of adjudication. This obligation is an obligation of
result because it imposes on member States the duty to immediately
facilitate the right of access to courts, as opposed to simply requiring
that they help avoid a violation of the right (i.e., due diligence
obligation), or set up an internal system capable of realizing the right
206
within a prescribed amount of time (i.e., programmatic obligation).
Also, the fundamental human right of access to courts goes to the
core of fundamental human rights, which have a universal nature rather
207
than a purely regional character.
Finally, Article 6 applies with
208
respect to proceedings related to “civil rights and obligations,” but,
according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, “the concept of ‘civil
rights and obligations’ cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the
domestic law of the respondent State, but must be given an autonomous
interpretation in the light of the object and purpose of the
209
Convention.”
Certain questions then arise relating to the
characterization of the category civil right under Article 6 of the ECHR.
B. Applicable Law
The first question that arises is whether the characterization of the
notion of civil rights under Art. 6 ECHR should be made only with
respect to the forum’s substantive law, or if it should also be made
according to foreign laws made applicable by virtue of relevant private
international law provisions. According to one thesis, reference should
210
only be made to the domestic law of the forum State. This thesis finds
203. See id. at 381.
204. Id. at 380.
205. See id. at 383.
206. See id. at 388.
207. See Arnold, supra note 106.
208. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols
Nos. 3,5,8, and 11 which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20 1971, Jan. 1 1990, and
Nov. 1 1998 respectively.
209.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTIONON
HUMAN RIGHTS 48 (1991).
210. See the references in Jean Claude Soyer and Michel De Salvia, Sub art. 6 ECHR,
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its basis in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, according to which
“[w]hether or not a right is to be regarded as civil within the meaning of
this expression in the Convention must be determined by reference to
the substantive content and effects of the right—and not its legal
211
classification—under the domestic law of the State concerned.” This
thesis, however, is unpersuasive for the following reasons. First, the
ECtHR jurisprudence just recalled was proffered in a purely domestic
case that did not pose the question of whether a right could be
considered as civil by reference to a foreign law. Second, a literal
interpretation of the relevant jurisprudence highlights that it not only
refers to the “substantive” law of the State concerned, but to its
“domestic” law in general, which includes the State’s private
international law rules, which may themselves reference foreign law.
Third, according to recent ECtHR jurisprudence, the terms “domestic
law” and “internal legal order” are synonymous with the notion of “the
212
juridical order of the contracting States.” Therefore:
[I]t is possible to interpret this reference as referring to
the ‘juridical system at stake,’ as much as, to say it
differently, the legal system applicable to the claim,
being it relevant or not in light of the ECHR. The lex
causae can pertain to a juridical system internal or
external to the ECHR. Thus, the source of the claimed
right is not relevant; the important thing is that it is
213
granted by an internal system of whatever nature.
Fourth, Article 6 has already been applied by the ECtHR in
international cases where a right was regarded as “civil” by reference to
214
laws distinct from those of the forum State.
Fifth, the alternative
thesis advanced here extends the scope of Article 6, and is thus in line
with the obligation of member States to interpret ECHR norms in an
in La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Commentaire article par article 250 (L.E.
Pettiti, E. Decaux & P. H. Imbert eds., Paris: Economica 1995).
211. König v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 6232/73, ¶¶ 89 (1978), available
at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int.
212. See MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 51–52.
213. “Il est alors possible d’interpréter cette référence comme visant ‘le système
juridique en cause,’ soit, en d’autre termes, l’ordre juridique applicable à la cause, qu’il relève
ou non de la CEDH. La lex causae peut émaner d’un ordre juridique tant interne qu’externe
à la Convention. Ainsi, peu importe la source du droit revendiqué, l’essentiel est qu’il trouve
un fondement dans un ordre juridique interne quelconque.” Id. at 52–53.
214. See id. at 62.
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extensive way.
C. Nature of the Proceeding
A second question that arises is whether the administrative
proceedings related to the granting of registered IPRs fall within the
category of proceedings related to civil rights. Note that this question
does not relate to unregistered IPRs, since those rights come into being
without condition of formalities and therefore without administrative
proceedings. According to the Human Rights Commission, while
“[t]here is no doubt that patent rights, once granted, must be considered
215
as civil rights within the meaning of Article 6(1)[,]” this Article does
not encompass proceedings between private persons and administrative
216
Hence, those
organs related to “the registration of patents.”
proceedings:
do[] not concern . . . the legal relationship between
private persons, but the objective right of an inventor visà-vis the Administration to be granted a patent if he has
fulfilled the necessary material and formal conditions. It
is true that the law provides that other private persons
may file objections against the registration of a patent in
a given case . . . . But it is also true that these objections
are limited to arguments that the objective conditions of
217
registration are not fulfilled.”
Thus, “under these circumstances the registration of patents must be
considered as an essentially administrative matter which is outside the
218
scope of Article 6 of the Convention.”
As a matter of fact, however, this jurisprudence has been overruled
by subsequent case law related to patents and designs. As for patents,
the ECtHR has established that “the patent application proceedings . . .
concern[] ‘the determination of civil rights and obligations’” and
219
therefore fall within the scope of Article 6 of the ECHR.
As for
215. X v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 7830/70, at 201 (1978), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
216. Id. at 202.
217. Id. at 201.
218. Id. at 201. See also X v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 8000/77
(1978).
219. British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No.
19589/92, ¶ 67 (1995), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. However, as regarding the right
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designs, the European Commission has established that an
administrative proceeding “decisive for the registration of the
applicant’s design [is] . . . comparable to that of a patent [and] . . .
therefore . . . involve[s] a determination of ‘civil rights’ within the
220
meaning of Article 6 . . . .”
This new ECtHR case law is convincing and may be extended to all
other registered IPRs, for the following reasons. First, in the Budweiser
decision of 2007, the ECtHR recognized that “an applicant for the
registration of a trade mark . . . owned a set of proprietary rights . . .
221
even though they can be revoked under certain conditions.”
This
decision supports the thesis that is related to patents but that is also
reasonably extendable to any IPRs and according to which “there
should be no doubt that the applicant for a patent, as well as the
patentee who seeks to have his revoked patent reinstated are both
222
protected under Article 6 (1) ECHR.”
Second, in regard to patents
within the various patent systems “the applicant is already presumed to
223
be the owner of the invention, regardless of its patentability.” Third,
in regards to any IPRs, ECtHR jurisprudence generally incorporates
within the notion of civil rights and obligations all disputes between
private persons and the State that do not concern the execution of
sovereign powers, and since as already mentioned, IPRs are not an
expression of the sovereignty of their granting States, proceedings in
to be heard, which is also based on Article 6 ECHR, the more recent Strasbourg
jurisprudence does not analyze whether the EPO proceeding at stake infringes this right but
limits itself to state that “the European Patent Convention provides for equivalent protection
as regards the Convention.” Rambus Inc. v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No.
40382/04, at 2 (2009), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (citing Lenzing AG v. Germany,
Eur. Ct. H.R. Application. No. 39025/97 (1999)). On these decisions and the Lenzing case
also before the European Strasbourg Court and the German Constitutional Court, see Jochen
Pagenberg, The ECJ on the Draft Agreement for a European Community Patent Court –
Hearing of May 18, 2010, INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 695 (2010). This
jurisprudence is therefore grounded on the principle of equivalence and is criticizable for all
the reasons that will be analyzed at the last paragraph of this paper. See also id. for critical
terms.
220. Denev v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 25419/94 (1997), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
221. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2007),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. See also Smith Kline and French Labs. Ltd. v.
Netherlands, App. No. 12633/87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int;
Melnychuk v. Ukraine, Eur. Ct. H.R. Application No. 28743/03 (2005), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available
at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
222. See CATARINA HOLTZ, DUE PROCESS FOR INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: EUROPEAN
PATENTING UNDER HUMAN RIGHTS CONTROL 132 (2003).
223. See id. at 131.
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respect thereto do not involve sovereign powers.
D. Possible Restrictions of the Right
The right of access to courts is not an absolute right. Hence, certain
restrictions on this right “are permitted by implication since the right of
224
access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State.”
Consequently, States may establish such regulations in accordance with
225
a certain “margin of appreciation” of the “needs and resources of the
226
community and of individuals.” However, these limitations fall within
the purview of the ECtHR’s oversight and control. Thus, in verifying
the legal character of such regulations, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
is authoritative, and a review thereof reveals that restrictions on the
right of access to courts must be established by law, must have a
legitimate aim, and must respond to the principle of proportionality.
As for the establishment by law requirement, restrictions must “have
227
228
some basis in domestic law,” be it of a statutory or a case law nature,
229
and have some internal or international origin. Furthermore, the laws
230
establishing the restrictions must have a certain “quality,” that is, they
231
must be “accessible to the person concerned,” “compatible with the
232
233
rule of law,” “consistent, clear and precise [and] . . . foreseeab[le].”
As for the requirement of a legitimate aim, among the aims the
ECtHR has considered legitimate are “advantages for the individual
234
235
concerned,”
advantages “for the administration of justice,”

224. Fogarty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37112/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 33 (2001),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
225. Id. at ¶ 33.
226. Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 38 (1975).
227. Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27 (1990), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
228. Ass’n Ekin v. France, App. No. 39288/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 46 (2001), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int, according to which “the concept of ‘law’ must be understood in its
‘substantive’ sense, not its ‘formal’ one. It therefore includes everything that goes to make up
the written law, including enactments of lower rank than statutes.” Id.
229. See MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 62, 133.
230. Kruslin, App. No. 11801/85 at ¶ 27.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Ekin, App. No. 39288/98 at ¶ 46. See also De Geouffre de la Pradelle v. France,
App. No. 12964/87, at 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 12, 1992), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int
(according to which the rule of law should be “sufficiently coherent and clear”).
234. Deweer v. Belgium, App. No. 6903/75, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (1980), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; Acquaviva v. France, App. No. 19248/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 66 (1995),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (“secure the interests of the defen[s]e”).
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compliance with public international law, and cooperation between
236
legal systems.
With regard to the proportionality requirement, the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR maintains that restrictions on the right of access are
proportionate where they realize a fair balance between the limits to the
right of access to courts and the aim sought to be achieved by the
237
restrictions.
In establishing whether this balance exists, member
States possess a margin of appreciation. However, this margin of
appreciation is subject to the control of the ECtHR in several respects.
First, in determining whether the State has exceeded its margin of
appreciation, the ECtHR examines the limitation applied to see if it
impairs the very essence of the right of access to courts. Furthermore,
the ECtHR adopts a restrictive method of interpretation that favors the
right of access. Hence, according to the ECtHR, the “right of access to
238
the courts [holds] . . . prominent place . . . in a democratic society.”
This conclusion is in line with the need to extensively interpret the right
of access to courts, especially when the right to be adjudicated by the
petitioned court is also a fundamental human right, as is the case with
IPRs.
E. International Jurisdiction Rules
Within this framework, one question that arises is whether a
member State of the ECHR is in breach of Article 6 when such State’s
courts refuse to try a case on the grounds that they do not have
international jurisdiction according to the relevant applicable
239
international jurisdiction rules.
The ECtHR has answered this
question on several occasions, maintaining that these rules can in
principle violate Article 6 of the ECHR. However, the ECtHR has also
invoked certain “peculiarities” or circumstances in denying that a
breach of Article 6 ECHR occurred. These conclusions seem grounded
on criticizable reasons of a political nature. Indeed, the following pages
235. Deweer, App. No. 6903/73 at ¶ 49. On the sound administration of justice see
MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 145; Luigi Mari, Equo Processo e Competenza in Materia
Contrattuale, NEW INSTRUMENTS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 673, 679 (2009).
236. See MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 145.
237. On the proportionality requirement as a general principle of international public
CANNIZZARO,
IL
PRINCIPIO
DELLA
PROPORZIONALITÀ
law
see
ENZO
NELL'ORDINAMENTO INTERNAZIONALE (2d. ed. 2000); RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 158
n.11.
238. Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 24 (1979), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
239.
See Fawcett, supra note 187, at 3.
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do not expose the numerous arguments that can be raised in opposition
to the solutions adopted by the ECtHR in such cases, but rather present
a systematic reconstruction of the principles that have been emphasized
by the ECtHR and that are relevant to demonstrate that the exclusive
240
jurisdiction rules go against the right of access to courts.
In the first case, the applicant, a dual Turkish and German citizen,
petitioned before a German Court an Iraqi Bank for breach of
241
contract. The German Court proceeded to ascertain whether the case
was sufficiently linked to Germany by reason of the plaintiff’s
nationality, to confer jurisdiction to hear the case. However, according
to Germany’s domestic rules on international civil procedure, such a
link was not sufficient to find German jurisdiction. Thus, the German
Court determined that it lacked competence to hear the case. The
applicant, then, asked the ECtHR to assess whether the German
Court’s failure to find jurisdiction infringed his fundamental human
right of access to courts. The ECtHR responded that the right of access
to courts “does not imply an unlimited right to choose the competent
tribunal. The international private law rules that limit the party
autonomy relevance are not incompatible as such to Article 6 § 1 of the
242
Convention.”
However, these rules on international jurisdiction must not be
arbitrary, but rather must be established by law. The court found that
these conditions were met, since
in the concrete case, having deeply examined the case
the German Courts concluded that they did not have
jurisdiction over it. They have deeply grounded their
decision. The reasons indicated by the German Courts
and criticized by the applicant exclude that these Courts
have come up with arbitrary conclusions attempting to
243
the equitableness of the proceeding at stake.
240. With respect to the exclusive jurisdiction rules it seems that a systematic
reconstruction of the ECtHR jurisprudence is currently still absent in the legal writings.
However, on the general incompatibility of the exclusive jurisdiction rules and the right of
access to courts see Arroyo, supra note 19, at 74.
241. Bayrak v. Germany, App. No. 27937/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (text available only in French).
242. “[N]'implique pas un droit illimité de choisir le tribunal compétent. Les règles du
droit international privé limitant le libre jeu de l'autonomie de la volonté ne sont pas
incompatibles avec l'article 6 § 1 de la Convention,” Id. at ¶ 2.
243. “En l'espèce, les tribunaux allemands ont conclu, après un examen approfondi, à
l’absence de leur compétence. Ils ont amplement motivé leurs décisions. Les motifs fournis
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Thus, the court concluded that the German Court’s declining of
jurisdiction had not improperly restricted the applicant’s fundamental
human right of access to courts.
In the second case, the applicant, Prince Hans-Adam II of
Liechtenstein, having learned that the municipality of Cologne obtained
a certain painting as a temporary loan from the Czech Republic,
brought a proceeding before the Cologne Regional Court against the
municipality of Cologne, maintaining that his late father was the true
owner of the loaned painting, which had been illegally confiscated from
244
his father by the government of the former Czechoslovakia in 1946.
The applicant requested that the municipality of Cologne deliver the
245
The German Court considered
painting to him, as his father’s heir.
whether the case was sufficiently linked to Germany, given that the
painting was in German territory and that the defendant was a German
246
municipality, for it to hear the case. Here however, Chapter 6, Article
3, of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the
War and Occupation, “excluded any review, by German Courts, of
measures carried out with regard to German external assets or other
property, seized for the purpose of reparation or restitution, or as a
247
result of the State of war.”
In the case in question, the former
government of Czechoslovakia had confiscated the painting in 1946 as a
248
measure against a German citizen as reparation for war damages.
249
Thus, the German Court declined its jurisdiction.
The applicant then asked the ECtHR to assess whether this
declining of jurisdiction infringed his fundamental human right of access
250
to courts.
The ECtHR emphasized that member States are
responsible for violating Article 6 of the ECHR even where they “limit
the applicant’s right of access to a Court in order to give effect to the
251
rules of an international agreement excluding [their] jurisdiction . . . .”
dans les décisions judiciaires critiquées par le requérant permettent d'exclure que les juges
aient tiré des conclusions de caractère arbitraire de nature à porter atteinte à l'équité de la
procédure.” Id. at ¶ 2.
244. Hans-Adam II v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 10–16 (2001),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
245. Id. at ¶ 15.
246. Id. at ¶ 16.
247. Id. at ¶ 61.
248. Id. at ¶ 11.
249. Id. at ¶ 51.
250. Id. at ¶ 52.
251. Id. at ¶ 52.
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In the case before it, the court determined that the restriction on the
applicant’s right of access to the German Court had a legitimate aim,
since it was “a consequence of the particular status of Germany under
252
public international law after the Second World War,” and that it
aimed at realizing “the vital public interest in regaining sovereignty and
253
unifying Germany.”
Moreover, the restriction on the applicant’s right of access to the
German Court was proportionate to the aim thereby pursued. Hence,
notwithstanding that the ECtHR’s previous jurisprudence had
established that the proportionality requirement was met only where
“reasonable alternative means . . . to protect effectively the rights under
254
the Convention” existed, the court found that the case before it
presented peculiarities, such as “the particular status of the Federal
Republic of Germany under public international law after the Second
255
256
World War,” that excluded the application of such jurisprudence.
Thus, the restriction on the applicant’s right of access to courts, as
imposed by the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of
the War and Occupation, met the proportionality requirement, even in
the absence of other reasonable means of effective recourse. The court
concluded, then, that the declining of jurisdiction by the German Court
257
had not improperly restricted the applicant’s right of access to courts.
In a third series of cases, the ECtHR dealt with rules regarding
immunity from jurisdiction of States and International Organization.
With regard to the immunity from jurisdiction of States, most of the
cases addressed by the ECtHR concern tort claims related either to
258
employment in a foreign diplomatic mission or to personal injuries
259
In both of these
sustained from “State “ acts amounting to torture.
categories of cases, the court pays particular attention as to whether the
State immunity rules involved not only had a legitimate aim but were
also proportional to that aim. As for the requisite for legitimate aim,
the court has established that “the grant of sovereign immunity to a
252. Id. at ¶ 59.
253. Id. at ¶ 69.
254. Id. at ¶ 48.
255. Id. at ¶ 68.
256. See id. at ¶ 37.
257. Id. at ¶ 69.
258. See Fogarty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 37112/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
259. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available
at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; McElhinney v. Ireland, App. No. 31253/96 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
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State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with
international law to promote comity and good relations between States
260
As for the
through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.”
requisite for degree of proportionality, the court has maintained that
“measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally
recogni[z]ed rules of public international law on State immunity cannot
in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on
261
the right of access to Court as embodied in Article 6 § 1.”
With regard to immunity from jurisdiction of International
262
Organization the most relevant case is Waite v. Germany. In this case,
the plaintiffs were two British citizens residing in Germany, who were
employed by a British Company and placed at the disposal of the
European Space Agency (ESA) to perform services at the European
263
Space Operations Center in Germany.
The applicants, after having
been informed that their employment with the British Company would
soon terminate, instituted proceedings before a German Labor Court
against the ESA, “arguing that, pursuant to the German Provision of
Labor (Temporary Staff) Act (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz), they
264
had acquired the status of employees of the ESA.” The ESA replied
that its immunity impeded the exercise of jurisdiction by the German
265
Courts.
The German Courts agreed, determining that the ESA had
validly relied on its immunity, and consequently declined to take
266
jurisdiction over the applicants’ claims.
The applicants then asked the ECtHR to assess whether this
declining of jurisdiction infringed their fundamental human right of
267
access to courts. The ECtHR, in turn, verified whether the restriction
placed on the applicants’ right of access to the German Court pursued a
legitimate aim and was proportionate, stating, with regard to the
requirement for legitimate aim:

260. Al-Adsani, App. No. 35763/97 at ¶ 54. This conclusion is highly criticized. See
HARRIS, O’BOYLE, & WARBRICK, supra note 200, at 243 n.170.
261. McElhinney, App. No. 31253/96 at 37; Al-Adsani, App. No. 35763/97 at ¶ 54.
262. Waite v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. See also Beer and Regan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1999), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
263. Waite, App. No. 26083/942 at ¶¶ 11–13.
264. Id. at ¶ 15.
265. Id. at ¶ 17.
266. Id. at ¶ 17–26.
267. Id. at ¶ 43.
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[T]he attribution of privileges and immunities to
international organi[z]ation is an essential means of
ensuring the proper functioning of such organi[z]ation
free from unilateral interference by individual
governments. The immunity from jurisdiction commonly
accorded by States to international organi[z]ation under
the
organi[z]ation
constituent
instruments
or
supplementary agreements is a long-standing practice
established in the interest of the good working of these
organi[z]ation. The importance of this practice is
enhanced by a trend towards extending and
strengthening international cooperation in all domains of
268
modern society.
Thus, “the rule of immunity from jurisdiction, which the German Courts
269
applied to ESA in the present case, has a legitimate objective.”
Likewise with regard to proportionality, the court stated that, on the
one hand, this requirement had to be verified both “in light of the
270
concrete circumstances of the case” and “in view of the prominent
271
place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial,” and on
the other hand, that the following two factors were relevant to
determine the proportionality of the restrictions at issue. First, “the
applicants [must have] . . . had available to them reasonable alternative
272
means to protect . . . their rights under the Convention.”
Second,
273
In the case before it, the
these means must have been “effective.”
court verified that
the ESA Convention, together with its Annex I,
expressly provides for various modes of settlement of
private-law disputes, in staff matters as well as in other
litigation . . . . Since the applicants argued an
employment relationship with ESA, they could and
274
should have had recourse to the ESA Appeals Board.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at ¶ 63.
Id. at ¶ 63.
Id. at ¶ 64.
Id. at ¶ 67.
Id. at ¶ 68.
Id. at ¶ 68.
Id. at ¶ 69.
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However, since the applicants invoked rights that were established by
German substantive labor law and not by the ESA, its dispute
settlement bodies probably would have dismissed their recourse, thus
providing them with an ineffective adjudication alternative.
Nonetheless, according to the court, it was possible to presume that
recourse to another effective tribunal existed in the case at hand since
all legal systems, and thus also the German one, are “in principle open
to temporary workers to seek redress from the firms that have
employed them and hired them out. Relying on general labour [sic]
regulations or, more particularly, on the German Provision of Labour
[sic] (Temporary Staff) Act, temporary workers can file claims in
275
damages against such firms.”
Thus, the court concluded that the
German Court’s declining of jurisdiction by reason of the ESA’s
immunity did not improperly restrict the applicants’ right of access to
276
courts.
To synthesize, a domestic court must adjudicate a case, even where it
would not generally do so according to its international procedure
norms, when its declining of jurisdiction would violate the right of access
to courts. Also, Article 6 of the ECHR obliges member States, in
principle, to grant access to their courts whenever a case is sufficiently
277
and not fortuitously linked to the forum State.
In contrast, member States can restrict the right of access to their
courts where all of the following four requirements are met. First, the
restrictions are established by law (whether of a domestic or an
international origin, and whether of a case law or a statutory nature),
and the law is sufficiently clear. Second, the restrictions pursue a
legitimate aim, which, according to the ECtHR, is the case only when
278
they comply with public international law. Third, the restrictions are
proportionate to the aim pursued; according to the ECtHR, restrictions
are proportionate when they pertain to cases involving the immunity of
275. Id. at ¶ 70.
276. Id. at ¶ 73.
277. See Mari, supra note 235, at 678. See also supra note 176 (explaining doctrine);
Bayrak v. Germany, App. No. 27937/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int; and; Hans-Adam II v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2001), available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. See also the dissenting opinion judge Rozakis in
McElhinney v. Ireland, App. No. 31253/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. On this dissenting opinion see infra.
278. Hence, examination of the European case law manifests that the aim of the sound
administration of justice is relevant only with respect to internal rules of competence in pure
internal cases. See also MARI, supra note 235, at 678.
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subjects, or present peculiarities such as “the particular status of the
Federal Republic of Germany under public international law after the
279
In contrast, restrictions are not proportionate
Second World War.”
when they impair in its essence the right of access to courts. Fourth, the
applicant can protect his or her rights through the use of other
reasonable and effective alternative means of recourse.
F. Alternative Means of Recourse
Particularly with respect to the last requirement, i.e., the existence of
(reasonable) alternative means of recourse, another question arises:
whether this requirement should be read as an alternative means in a
third State or in an international organization (hereinafter: third States
and international organization will be jointly referred to as third States),
or whether it should be interpreted as requiring alternative means
within the forum/defendant (hereafter defendant) State before the
ECtHR that declines jurisdiction.
According to the part of the ECtHR’s Waite and Kennedy decision
that established that the existence of (reasonable) alternative means of
recourse should be read as an alternative means of recourse in either a
third State or third legal system, rather than in the defendant State, this
requirement is met when alternative means exist in a third State, rather
than within the defendant State. So a first thesis maintains that this
conclusion takes into account the plurality of legal systems, is a
consequence of the coordination purpose proper of private international
law and, therefore, “appears particularly welcomed since this
coordination purpose allows to take into account that the lack of
competence influences the right of access to a court only temporarily,
being the interested parties invited to put themselves in a better
280
situation.” Indeed, this European case law and the thesis proffered in
support thereof (hereinafter: the thesis here criticized) are not
persuasive for the following arguments.
The first argument arises from the inconsistency of the thesis here
criticized. On the one hand, it acknowledges that in international cases
the interests of individuals in having access to courts are even stronger
than in purely domestic cases, since “the consequences arising out of a
279. Hans-Adam II v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 59 (2001),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
280. Translated to English from MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 165. “Apparaît
particulièrement opportune puisqu’elle permet de prendre en compte le fait que
l’incompétence affecte le droit d’accès au tribunal seulement de manière temporaire, les
individus étant invités à mieux se pourvoir.”
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lacking of international jurisdiction according to private international
law can reveal themselves to be much more annoying for the interested
party that the absence of internal competence in the internal legal
281
order,” and thus “the international element contributes to diminish
282
the freedom of States to refuse to adjudicate cases.” Yet, on the other
hand, the thesis here criticized maintains that the same international
character of the cases at issue allows the courts of the forum State to
decline jurisdiction whenever another foreign court is competent to hear
the same case. Thus, the thesis here criticized supports a conclusion that
is the exact opposite of the previous conclusion just recalled that it
purported to maintain.
The second argument derives from a systematic stricto sensu
interpretation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR and the ECHR system itself.
Hence, under the thesis here criticized, when a complaint is made for a
breach of the ECHR, the ECtHR is obliged to examine the complaint
by reference not only to the legal system of the respondent State, but
also to the systems of third-party States, which could eventually include
ECHR non-member States. However:
[W]hen a complaint is made for a breach of the
Convention, the complaint should be examined by the
[European Court with] reference only to the legal system
of the respondent State. Any defects or other problems
relating to such a system cannot be remedied by
reference to the legal system of any other High
Contracting Party, whether neighbo[]ring to the
respondent State or not. Therefore, the fact that the
applicant . . . had the possibility of a judicial remedy in
[another legal system] in respect of his grievance should
be irrelevant to the issue before the Court, which was
solely and exclusively whether the applicant had access
to the Courts in [the defendant State] in respect of the
283
same complaint.
281. Translated to English from MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 157. “Les
conséquences liées au refus d’une compétence en matière de droit international privé
peuvent se révéler beaucoup plus ennuyeuses pour les individus que la négation d’une
compétence territoriale dans l’ordre interne.”
282. Translated to English from MARCHADIER, supra note 187, at 156. “L’élément
international contribue à réduire la liberté des Etats de refuser leur compétence.”
283. See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loukis Loucaides in McElhinney v. Ireland,
App. No. 31253/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), according to whom “I think it is unfair as well as
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This conclusion ought to be embraced even more fervently in cases
where the third-party State in question is not an ECHR member.
The third argument again relies on a systematic stricto sensu
interpretation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ECHR.
Hence, the thesis here criticized allows domestic courts to decline their
jurisdiction whenever other means of recourse exist abroad. As aliens
are more often involved in transnational cases than citizens, and
transnational cases are more likely to be heard by foreign courts than
are pure internal cases, the right of access to the forum State’s courts
can be derogated more often in cases involving aliens than in cases
involving citizens.
Therefore, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
indirectly and de facto discriminates by reason of nationality, and
284
thereby contradicts Article 14 of the ECHR.
The fourth argument relies on a teleological interpretation of Article
6.1 of the ECHR. The opinion here criticized allows domestic courts to
decline their jurisdiction whenever other means of recourse exist
abroad. Thus, this opinion restrictively interprets Article 6 by limiting
its scope to cases that cannot be heard abroad. However, such an
interpretation is contrary to the need to read the provisions posed by
the ECHR in an extensive way.
The fifth argument relies on a systematic lato sensu interpretation of
Article 6.1 of the ECHR and of international jurisdiction rules in
general. Here, it is necessary to distinguish international jurisdiction
rules of an internal or domestic nature from those imposed by
international conventions.
The former types of rules allocate
international jurisdiction to the courts of the forum State without
considering whether other foreign courts are competent to hear the
same case, and, as such, have a unilateral, rather than a bilateral,
character. The opinion here criticized, however, imposes on the
petitioned courts seized the duty to also take into account the
international jurisdiction of foreign courts, and as such is contrary to the
nature of these rules.
With respect to the international jurisdiction norms of a
conventional origin, the result is at least partially the same. These rules

odd to expect the applicant to have recourse to another State as a solution to his problem of
lack of access to a court in his own country, against which his complaint was directed.”
284. On the violation of Article14 ECHR realized by way of indirect discriminations
see ODDNÝ MJÖLL ARNARDÓTTIR, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (2003).
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allocate international jurisdiction to the courts of a member State, this
time while taking into account whether or not other foreign courts are
competent to hear the same case, and as such have a bilateral nature.
However, these rules do not consider the international jurisdiction
provisions of non-member States; and therefore, have a unilateral
nature when examined not with respect to the sole systems of their
member States, but in relation to the entire international framework.
Thus, this thesis is also contrary to the nature and scope of the
internationally derived international jurisdiction rules, at least with
respect to third States.
The sixth argument also relies on a systematic lato sensu
interpretation of Article 6.1 of the ECHR, and international jurisdiction
rules. The thesis here criticized cites the aim of coordinating the
proceedings that are proper to international jurisdiction rules. Yet the
right of access to courts, as set forth in Article 6 of the ECHR, is a
fundamental human right. Thus, the aim of coordinating proceedings
cannot prevail over the fundamental human right of access to courts.
This conclusion can be reached even when the international jurisdiction
rules are established by international conventions. In this respect, this
conclusion is in line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, according to
which ECHR member States are responsible for violating ECHR
Article 6 even when they limit the applicant’s right of access to courts in
order to give effect to the rules of an international agreement.
The seventh argument is based on opportunity reasons. The thesis
here criticized imposes on the forum State’s court a duty to establish,
before they decline jurisdiction, whether the case at hand can be
adjudicated effectively by foreign State courts. However, forum State
courts apply their own domestic rules of international civil procedure,
which do not establish the international jurisdiction of foreign State
courts. Thus, to verify that other foreign courts have the requisite
international jurisdiction to hear a case, the forum State’s court must
verify the domestic rules on international jurisdiction for every legal
system in the world. Opportunity reasons, then, suggest exempting
domestic courts from performing such a difficult or impossible task, and
instead requiring only that those courts verify if other reasonable means
of recourse are available within their forum State, according to their
own international jurisdiction rules.
The eighth argument is based on the dissenting opinion of Judge
285
Rozakis in the McElhinney case.
The dissent referenced the part of
285.

McElhinney, App. No. 31253/96 at n.209 (Judge Rozakis’ dissenting opinion).

UBERTAZZI - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

426

MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW

6/20/2011 1:06 PM

[Vol. 15:2

the ECtHR’s Waite and Kennedy decision that established that the
existence of reasonable alternative means of recourse should be read as
an alternative means of recourse in either a third State or third legal
286
system, rather than in the defendant State.
The dissenting Judge
maintained that the decision “referred to specific circumstances
concerning persons working within an international organi[z]ation and
labour [sic] disputes for which internal proceedings existed and were
known to the applicants when they decided to become employees of the
287
organi[z]ation[,]” and emphasized, in contrast, that in cases where the
defendant is a foreign State, rather than an international organization,
“the applicant did not have any [such] link with the [foreign State’s]
288
jurisdiction . . . or any kind of allegiance and loyalty to [it].”
The
Judge thus stated that the part of the Waite and Kennedy decision
concerning alternative means of recourse did not apply, and the
requirement of the existence of reasonable alternative means of
recourse should, accordingly, be read as alternative means within the
289
defendant State, rather than in third States. This opinion deserves to
be approved.
In synthesis, the requirement of the existence of reasonable
alternative means of recourse cannot be read as alternative means in a
third State, but must be interpreted as alternative means that allow
290
access to the courts of the defendant State.

286. Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4.
287. Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4.
288. Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4.
289. Id. at Rozakis’ Dissent ¶ 4. According to whom “[i]n any event, I seriously
dispute an unqualified transposition of a principle that the Court applied in a specific
category of case (e.g. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany)—namely the circumscribed scope of
Article 6 in circumstances where a State party to the Convention has relinquished parts of its
jurisdiction to an international organi[z]ation—to all cases involving a jurisdictional
plurality.” Id.
290. See McElhinney, App. No. 31253/96 (Judge Loucaides’ dissenting opinion),
according to whom:
it is correct that Article 6 may be subject to inherent limitations, but these
limitations should not affect the core of the right. Procedural conditions
such as time-limits, the need for leave to appeal etc. do not affect the
substance of the right. But completely preventing somebody from having
his case determined by a Court, without any fault on his part and
regardless of the nature of the case, contravenes, in my opinion, Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
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G. Exclusive Jurisdiction
Finally, the last question that arises in this context is whether the
right of access to courts can be improperly restricted by international
jurisdiction norms that establish exclusive jurisdiction in certain fora.
The ECtHR has not yet provided an answer to this specific question.
However, it is apparent that the conclusions reached in parts E and F of
this Section with respect to all other general international jurisdiction
rules apply, mutatis mutandis, to exclusive jurisdiction provisions.
Furthermore, no reasons can be invoked to proscribe this application.
Thus, the rules on exclusive jurisdiction violate the right of access to
courts because, by their proper nature, they restrict this access when the
case at hand does not enter into the exclusive jurisdiction of the forum
State, although it meets all the requirements necessary to consider
improper the restriction in question.
V. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IMPLIES A DENIAL OF JUSTICE AND
VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS
A. Denial of Justice
The public international law rules on denial of justice, forum
necessitatis, and on the right of access to courts will now be applied to
exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPR cases. To this end the Voda,
Lucasfilm, and GAT cases will be adopted as examples, because they
constitute the most recent jurisprudence involving the application of
exclusive jurisdiction within the context of IPR cross-border litigation.
Furthermore, with particular reference to Article 6 of the ECHR, while
it is true that this Article does not apply to the United States, and thus,
to the Voda case, a systematic interpretation of Article 6 can influence
the application of the already-examined corresponding rules on right of
access to courts that are in force in the United States. Therefore, the
arguments based on Article 6 can also be adopted, mutatis mutandis,
with respect to the U.S. Voda case.
As for denial of justice and forum necessitatis, in the Voda case, both
parties were U.S.-domiciled companies and the controversy concerned
several European, British, Canadian, French, and German patents, in
291
addition to U.S. patents. Accordingly, the case was sufficiently linked
to the United States, and met the first connection requirement of the
denial of justice/forum necessitatis rule. However, the U.S. Court of

291.

Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Voda was required to bring its
British, Canadian, French, German, and European patent infringement
claims before the respective courts of the United Kingdom, Canada,
France, Germany, and each single State for which a European patent
was granted, since each State was held to have exclusive jurisdiction
292
over its patent infringement claims. In so holding, the U.S. Court of
293
Appeals required that Voda should duplicate its proceedings.
The duplication of proceedings in IPR cases has been shown to
increase their costs.
According to the already-mentioned study
Economic-Cost Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated European
Patent Litigation System,
between 146 and 311 patent infringement cases are being
duplicated annually in EU Member States. By 2013, this
number is likely to increase to between 202 and 431
duplicated cases. Total private savings from having
access to a unified patent proceeding would span the
294
interval between EUR 148 and 289 million.
Moreover, the costs of the duplication of proceedings are even higher
where the systems involved are such as the United Kingdom one.
Hence, “the average cost of pursuing through to first instance trial a
patent infringement action in the U.K. is approximately 500,000, and
this is about three times the cost of an infringement action in most other
295
European jurisdictions.”
Furthermore, the duplication of proceedings in IPR cases can lead to
divergent outcomes, as occurred in a recent series of cases.
In the Epilady case (EP0101656), infringement suits of
the patent-holder were successful in Belgium, Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands, but not successful in Austria,
France and the United Kingdom. In Securities System
Inc. vs. ECB (EP0455750), the German and Dutch
292. Id. at 898–904.
293. Id. at 898–904.
294. See Harhoff, supra note 149, at 5. This study refers explicitly to the Unified
Patent Court (ECPC), see infra. However, its results are extensible to any other unitary
enforcement system of national and foreign patents.
295. See David Knight, The Reducing Cost of European and U.K. Patent Litigation?,
PATENT WORLD (May 28, 2008), http://www.ffw.com/publications/all/articles/reducing-costpatent.aspx.
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Courts upheld the patent, while it was revoked in France
and the UK. In the Senseo case (EP0404717), initial
divergent rulings have been issued by Belgian and Dutch
Courts, but several other national cases are still pending.
In the Monsanto case (EP0546090), the District Court of
The Hague gave an interim judgment on March 19, 2008
and referred the case to the European Court of Justice
for an interpretation of Directive 98/44/EC of 6.7.1998 on
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions;
several parallel cases are pending in different Member
296
States.
Moreover, another case that exemplifies the risk of divergent
outcomes due to the duplication of proceedings is the European Central
297
Bank (ECB) v. Document Security Systems Inc. (DSS) case.
To
properly describe this case, it is relevant to refer to the wording of the
decision rendered by the U.K. Court of Appeal on March 19, 2008. The
controversy according to the court was that a U.S. company
contend[ed] that [its] patent . . . and its sister patents are
infringed by euro banknotes.
Imaginatively but
overoptimistically it tried to bring central proceedings
before the Court of First Instance of the EU. On 5th
September 2007, that Court held, not surprisingly, it had
no jurisdiction to hear patent infringement proceedings
even against an EU institution, case T-295/05.
Meanwhile the ECB had started revocation proceedings
in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria.
These are
298
ongoing.
Prior to the U.K. Court of Appeals decision, there were several
conflicting judgments coming from different jurisdictions concerning the
299
validity of the patent:

296. See Harhoff, supra note 149, at 15 n.20.
297. See European Central Bank v. Document Security Systems Inc., [2008] EWCA
(Civ). 192 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/192.html.
298. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.
299. Id. at ¶ 4.
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The
German
Federal
Patent
Court
(Bundespatentgericht) did not agree with [the U.K.
Court of First Instance decision in the case ECB v. DSS
invalidating the patent and] . . . held the patent valid.
Then, on 9 January 2008, the French Court (le Tribunal
de Grande Instance de Paris) agreed with [the U.K. first
instance decision] and disagreed with the German Court.
On 12th March 2008 the Dutch Court agreed with the
German Court. In sporting terms, the score is currently
2-2 to the ECB at first instance level. All this is deeply
regrettable. It illustrates yet again the need for a onestop patent shop (with a ground floor department for
first instance and a first floor department for second
300
instance) for those who have Europe-wide businesses.
Finally, the U.K. Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal and
301
confirmed the first instance decision holding the patent void.
In light of the above, requiring the plaintiff in the Voda case to
address its claims to the courts of each of the foreign States where the
patents had been granted was unreasonable and ineffective, and thereby
met the second requirement of the denial of justice/forum necessitatis
rule.
In the Lucasfilm case, the denial of justice was even more apparent.
First, the case involved defendants who were not only domiciled in the
United Kingdom but had also perpetrated their infringing acts from the
302
United Kingdom. Thus, the U.K. Court’s declining of jurisdiction was
contrary to the Brussels Regulation. According to its Article 2
provision, “persons domiciled in a Member State shall . . . be sued in the
303
courts of that Member State.” The defendants were domiciled in the
United Kingdom; therefore, the U.K. Court had jurisdiction to hear the
case. However, this conclusion was not reached by the U.K. Court of
Appeal for two different reasons. First, Article 2 of the Brussels
Regulation did not ground the U.K. Court’s jurisdiction, since it
conditions its application upon the existence of not only the “personal
304
305
jurisdiction,” but also the “subject-matter jurisdiction of the court,”

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at ¶¶ 3–5.
Id. at ¶ 52.
Lucasfilm Entm’t Co. v. Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1328, ¶¶ 100, 103 (Eng.).
Id. at ¶ 123.
Id. at ¶ 127.
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which does not exist where “the wrongs [are] done outside the EU by
306
persons who happen to be domiciled within the EU.” Second, Article
2 of the Brussels I Regulation did not ground the U.K. Court’s
jurisdiction since the subject matter of the case at hand entered into the
exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts, which exclusive jurisdiction
was purportedly established implicitly by the CUP, CUB, PCT and
307
TRIPs agreement.
However, neither of the arguments adopted by the U.K. Court is
convincing. With respect to the first argument, on the one hand, the
notions of personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction are
common law concepts extraneous to the Brussels I Regulation, which
conditions its general application upon the sole presence of the
defendants’ domicile inside the European Union, without posing any
308
further proximity requirements to the EU territory.
On the other
hand, the Lucasfilm case presented additional connections to the EU
territory, since the defendants perpetrated the infringing acts from the
United Kingdom. With respect to the second argument, as we have
already noted, the purported implicit exclusive jurisdiction provision in
the CUP, CUB, PCT and TRIPs agreement not only does not exist, but
nevertheless it would be contrary to public international law if it did.
Furthermore, even where the Brussels I Regulation was not to be
applied, the U.K. Court’s declining of jurisdiction was contrary to forum
necessitatis, since the Lucasfilm case presented a sufficient link with the
United Kingdom to meet the first requirement of the denial of
justice/forum necessitatis rule. Also, according to the U.K. Court of

305. Id. at ¶ 127.
306. Id. at ¶ 129.
307. See id. at ¶ 107–108.
308. See Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, ECJ 145 (Feb. 7, 2006); Case C-281/02, Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383
¶¶ 25–26. See also Torremans, supra note 6, at 752 according to whom in the Lucasfilm case:
the dangerous consequence of the analysis put forward by the Court of
Appeal is that this jurisdiction is declined and that a substantial risk is
created that not a single court will be available and willing to hear the
case and to do justice between the parties. The Court itself indicates that
Ainsworth does no longer travel to the US and will in this way be able to
escape the jurisdiction of the US courts, and in the next phase the Court
of Appeal refuse to recognise and enforce the Californian judgment in the
U.K. This kind of denial of justice is undesirable and dangerous, but it will
be the inevitable consequence of the approach taken by the court.
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Appeal, the United States had exclusive jurisdiction to address the
infringement of U.S. copyrights. However, the U.K. Court of Appeal
did not enforce the judgment rendered by the U.S. Court in the
infringement action already brought by the plaintiffs in the United
States. Thus, the United Kingdom’s non-enforcement of the decision of
the U.S. Court, which was the ordinary competent court according to
the United Kingdom, rendered access to that U.S. tribunal ineffective
with respect to the United Kingdom. Therefore, the non-enforcement
of the U.S. judgment constituted a legal obstacle to effectively exercise
the right of access to U.S. Courts. As such, in the United Kingdom it
met the second requirement of the denial of justice/forum necessitatis
rule.
In the GAT case, both the plaintiff and defendant were companies
309
established in Germany.
The case, therefore, was sufficiently linked
with Germany to meet the first requirement of the denial of
justice/forum necessitatis rule. Moreover, in the GAT case, the patents
at issue were granted by a single State, France. Thus, the declining of
jurisdiction by the German Court imposed by the ECJ’s GAT decision
obligated the plaintiff to bring the proceeding before a French Court,
which had ordinary exclusive jurisdiction to hear the validity issues of
the French patents. Yet the exclusive jurisdiction of the French Court
concerned the sole issue of whether the French patents were valid; it did
not address their infringement. Rather, the German Court had ordinary
jurisdiction to examine the infringement claims, by reason of the general
jurisdiction criterion of the Brussels System, which granted jurisdiction
to the country of the defendant’s domicile, here, Germany. As a result,
the German Court had to stay its proceeding while it referred to the
French Court the issue of the French patents’ validity, and after the
French Court’s decision on the validity of the patents, the German
310
Court had to resume the case and examine the infringement claims.
Indeed, proceeding in this manner would have produced a duplication
of disputes. Thus, even the GAT case met the second requirement of
the denial of justice/forum necessitatis rule.

309. Case C-4/03, GAT v. LuK, 2006 E.C.R. I-6509, ¶ 8.
310. The ECJ GAT decision did not establish explicitly the necessity to proceed in this
manner. However, this necessity can be gleaned from the interpretation thereof. See
Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar, at 27. See also supra note 7 (collecting and
construing jurisprudence that proceeds in this manner, as well as the contrary jurisprudence
that declines its jurisdiction not only on the validity issues but also on the infringement
claims).
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B. Violation of the Fundamental Human Right of Access to Courts
As for the fundamental right of access to courts, in the Voda case, by
virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction rules purported to exist, the U.S.
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Voda’s infringement claims
related to foreign patents. Thus, in that case, the exclusive jurisdiction
rules not only impeded Voda’s access to the U.S. Court with respect to
its foreign patent infringement claims, but also restricted Voda’s
fundamental human right of access to the U.S. Courts.
Furthermore, this restriction was improper for the following reasons.
First, a sufficient and non-fortuitous link existed between the case and
the forum State. Second, the restriction on the right of access to courts
was not established by a sufficiently clear law. Rather, it was grounded
on implicit rules of public international law alleged to exist. Third, the
restriction did not pursue a legitimate aim. Here, the purported aim was
to comply with public international law, but public international law not
only does not impose implicit exclusive jurisdiction rules, but considers
such rules illegal. Fourth, the restriction was not proportionate to the
aim pursued. Here, the restriction concerned neither matters regarding
immunity from jurisdiction nor cases presenting certain recognized
peculiarities. The restriction also impaired in its essence the right of
access to courts, since on the one hand Voda did not have other means
of recourse available in the United States, and on the other hand, the
means of recourse available to Voda outside the United States implied a
duplication of proceedings and, therefore, were ineffective.
In the Lucasfilm case, the violation of the right of access to courts
was even more apparent. There, by virtue of the purported exclusive
jurisdiction of U.S. Courts, the U.K. Court of Appeal declined to
exercise jurisdiction over infringement claims of U.S. copyrights.
Exclusive jurisdiction rules impeded access to the U.K. Court, and
restricted the plaintiff’s right of access to courts, as set forth in Article 6
of the ECHR.
Furthermore, this restriction was illegal for the following reasons.
First, a sufficient and non-fortuitous link existed between the case and
the forum State. Second, for the same reasons explained with respect to
the Voda case, the restriction on the right of access to courts was not
established by a sufficiently clear law. Third, and again for the same
reasons explicated with respect to the Voda case, the restriction in issue
did not pursue a legitimate aim. Fourth, the restriction on the right of
access to courts was not proportionate to the aim it pursued. The
plaintiff did not have other means of recourse available in the United
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Kingdom, but had other means of recourse available outside the United
Kingdom. Thus, the plaintiff supposedly could have brought the
infringement of his U.S. copyright before a U.S. Court. Yet the plaintiff
had already availed himself of this means of recourse, obtaining a
judgment from the U.S. Courts that the U.K. Court refused to enforce.
This action thus demonstrated that while, in arguendo, in conformity
with the ECtHR Waite and Kennedy decision, an “alternative means of
recourse” existed in a country (the United States) different than the
forum State (the United Kingdom), this (allegedly) existing available
alternative means of recourse was in fact ineffective.
Likewise, in the GAT case, by virtue of an extensive interpretation
of the exclusive jurisdiction rules posed by Article 16.4 of the Brussels
Convention, the German Court had to decline its jurisdiction with
respect to the validity claims of the plaintiff’s French patents. Thus,
here again, the application of exclusive jurisdiction rules would have
impeded access to the German Court and restricted LuK’s right of
access to courts, as established in Article 6 of the ECHR.
Furthermore, this restriction was illegal for the following reasons.
First, a sufficient and non-fortuitous link existed between the case and
Germany. Second, the restriction on the right of access to courts was
not established by a sufficiently clear law. Rather, the restriction in
issue was grounded in an extensive interpretation by the ECJ of Article
16.4 of the Brussels Convention that does not explicitly extend the scope
of the exclusive jurisdiction rule to IPR validity issues not raised in a
principal way but rather as a plea in objection. Moreover, before the
GAT decision, the ECJ had highlighted the “restrictive nature of the
311
provision contained in Article 16 (4)” and thus had interpreted it in a
restrictive way. That interpretative treatment thus gave rise to a
legitimate expectation that a restrictive interpretation was to also be
adopted with respect to IPR validity issues raised as a plea in an
objection, excluding them from the scope of Article 16.4. Third, for the
same reasons explicated with respect to the Voda case, the restriction at
issue did not pursue a legitimate aim. Fourth, the restriction was not
proportionate to the aim pursued. LuK did not have other means of
recourse available in Germany, and while other means of recourse were
available to LuK outside Germany, the utilization of those means
produced a duplication of proceedings that thereby made them
312
ineffective.
311.
312.

See Case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, 1983 E.C.R. 3663, ¶ 23.
This duplication of proceedings is different from that of certain legal systems,
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C. PIL and Human Rights Solutions
In the Voda, Lucasfilm, and GAT cases, then, the rules on exclusive
jurisdiction resulted in denial of justice to the respective IPR owners,
violating forum necessitatis and the fundamental human right of access
to courts. Since the Voda, Lucasfilm, and GAT cases are the most
recent expression of the application of exclusive jurisdiction in IPR
cross-border litigation, mutatis mutandis, their conclusions may be easily
extended to all other international IPR disputes.
To avoid denial of justice and to safeguard the right of access to
courts, States should follow three different, concurrent approaches, each
of which leads to the same results. First, from a de lege ferenda
perspective States must declare as unconstitutional or overrule their
explicit exclusive jurisdiction provisions, and also revisit their case law
according to which exclusive jurisdiction rules are implicitly imposed by
public international law. Second, also from a de lege lata perspective
313
States must adopt “the private international law solution” (hereafter
the PIL solution). According to the PIL solution, States must search for
other rules of private international law that are different and prevailing
over the rules that would otherwise lead to the declining of jurisdiction.
Then, States must find these rules in forum necessitatis, which is a PIL
rule and a general principle of law, and which therefore has a direct
effect and prevails over exclusive jurisdiction rules (domestic or of the
Brussels system). Finally, States must adopt this forum and thus
exercise jurisdiction by necessity despite exclusive jurisdiction
provisions. Third, always from a de lege lata perspective, States must
314
adopt “the human rights solution.” According to this solution, States
must recognize the right of access to courts as a general principle of law,
and in any case the ECHR primacy over the other international,
European, and domestic rules on exclusive jurisdiction, such as those of
the Brussels System. Then, the States must recognize that to decline
jurisdiction by reason of the exclusive jurisdiction rules would constitute
a breach of the ECHR by a court. Furthermore, States must refer to

such as the German one, according to which the German Court competent to address the IPR
validity issue incidentally raised is not the same court that is competent to examine its
infringement issue. Hence, it is apparent that the former kind of duplication of proceedings
requires much more “entry thresholds (such as language, distance, costs, mentality) for
parties to the litigation system” than the latter one. Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 826,
referring to the ECPC on which see infra.
313. See James Fawcett, supra note 187, at 37.
314. Id.
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this violation “as the ground for not so acting,” and therefore of not
declining jurisdiction. Finally, States must exercise jurisdiction despite
exclusive jurisdiction provisions.
As for the PIL solution, in the Voda case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
should have exercised its jurisdiction by necessity over all of Voda’s
infringement claims, regardless of whether the patents involved were
national or foreign. Likewise, in the Lucasfilm case, the U.K. Court of
Appeal should have exercised its jurisdiction by necessity to enforce the
U.S. copyrights at stake. Finally, in the GAT case, the German Court
should have exercised its jurisdiction by necessity over both LuK’s
French patents’ validity and infringement claims. Particularly with
respect to the GAT case, the exercise of jurisdiction by necessity by the
German Court over the validity of LuK’s French patents is contrary to
the ECJ’s GAT decision.
However, a literal interpretation of this decision highlights that it
does not address the compatibility of forum necessitatis with the
exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Convention and, thus, cannot
be interpreted as maintaining that the latter prevails with respect to the
former. Second, a teleological interpretation of the ECJ’s GAT decision
highlights that the court did not intend to speak on the compatibility of
forum necessitatis and the exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels
Convention; thus, its decision cannot be construed in that sense. Third,
allowing the German Court to exercise its jurisdiction by necessity is in
line with the already-demonstrated finding that forum necessitatis is
adoptable within the framework of the Brussels System, even in
derogation of its exclusive jurisdiction provisions. Finally, even
assuming, in arguendo, that the GAT decision was interpreted as
implying the prevalence of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the
Brussels System over forum necessitatis, EU member States would
nonetheless be compelled to derogate from the precedent set by that
ECJ case to realize the general principle of law of forum necessitatis.
As for the human rights solution, the U.S. Court of Appeals in the
Voda case should have exercised jurisdiction over all of Voda’s patent
infringements claims, regardless of whether the patents involved were
national or foreign; the U.K. Court of Appeal in the Lucasfilm case
should have exercised its jurisdiction to enforce the U.S. copyrights at
issue; and the German Court in the GAT case should have exercised its
jurisdiction over both LuK’s validity and infringement claims.
Particularly with regard to the GAT case, the infringement of Article
315.

Id.
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16.4 of the Brussels Convention (now Article 22.4 of the Brussels I
Regulation) that would have, according to the ECJ, followed from the
German Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the validity issues of the
French patents, would have been necessary for the German State to
avoid liability for violating Article 6 of the ECHR.
Finally, with particular reference to the GAT case, the result just
proposed was partially achieved by a recent Dutch decision rendered by
the District Court of The Hague in the 2007 Single Buoy Moorings v.
316
Bluewater case. In this case, the owner of a European patent sued a
Dutch company, claiming that by manufacturing and/or offering the
essential parts of the plaintiff’s patented invention with knowledge that
such parts would be installed by a third party in two countries for which
the plaintiff had been granted the European patent (U.K. and Norway),
the defendant committed “a special form of indirect cross-border
317
infringement.” The defendant raised the question of the invalidity of
the European patent before the Dutch Court. Thus, according to the
ECJ’s GAT decision, the Dutch Court should have declined its
jurisdiction (at least) on the validity issues of the English and Norway
portions of the European patent at stake. However, the District Court
of The Hague distinguished between the GAT case and the dispute
before it, stating that while the former “concerned a declaration of noninfringement of a European patent in various countries (and thus with a
possibility to split up in a declaration per country),” the claim before the
Dutch Court concerned a declaration of infringement and “contain[ed]
the judgment of the validity of a European patent in two territories” and
therefore was “different from GAT/LuK,” and unlike GAT could “not
318
be split up.” In other words, the claim before the German Court in
GAT concerned the judgment of the validity of a French patent in just
one territory (France). However, in the case before the Dutch Court,

316. Cross-border Jurisdiction after GAT/LuK: International “Indirect” Infringement,
NAUTADUTILH E-NEWSLETTER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, June 6, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.newsletter-nautadutilh.com/EN/xzine/intellectual_property/enewsletter_patent_law/crossborder_jurisdiction_after_gat/luk_international_indirect_infringement.html?cid=4&xzine_id=
3925&aid=9631. See also John Anders, et al., Liability for Contributory Infringement of IPRs
– Certain Aspects of Patent Infringement, THE NETH. INT’L ASSOC. FOR THE PROT. OF
INTELL.
PROP.,
available
at
https://www.aippi.org/download/comitees/204/GR204the_netherlands.pdf. On contributory
infringement see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Rochelle Dreyfuss, & Annette Kur, The Law
Applicable To Secondary Liability In Intellectual Property Cases, 42 JILP 201, (2009).
317. See NautaDutilh, supra note 316.
318. Id. at 4.4.
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the claim would involve determining the validity of a European patent
in two territories, U.K. and Norway, creating a risk of conflicting
judgments with respect to validity which in the Dutch Court’s opinion
would have rendered reaching a judgment on infringement impossible.
The court considered this undesirable and in conflict with Article 6 of
319
the ECHR.
Furthermore, the Dutch Court established that although it
considered itself to be competent to adjudicate the case, the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of the Brussels System as interpreted by the ECJ
GAT decision obliged it to “defer a decision concerning the validity of a
foreign patent, if nullity proceedings are instituted in the involved
foreign country, without regard to the stage of the Dutch
320
proceedings.”
However, since in the case in question, no nullity
proceedings had been instituted before the implicated Norwegian and
U.K. Courts, the Dutch Court decided to examine the European patent
validity issue with respect to its Norwegian and U.K. parts as raised by
the defendant.
This decision deserves to be particularly welcomed because it takes
into account the inopportuneness of the GAT solution, and it tries to
escape it. Thus, the first conclusion from this decision regarding the
incompatibility of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Brussels
System with Article 6 of the ECHR, deserves to be approved for all the
arguments examined in previous sections.
However, the second conclusion regarding the obligation of the
Dutch Court to defer the validity issue of the foreign portions of the
European patent to their respective domestic courts only if nullity
proceedings were instituted before them, as well as the reasons
grounding both conclusions of this decision, are not convincing. Thus,
first even if nullity proceedings were instituted before the respective
domestic courts of the foreign portions of the European patent, the
exclusive jurisdiction rules shall still be considered illegal and therefore
inapplicable for all the arguments already examined in this Section,
which militate against them. Second, the alleged differences between
the case pending before the Dutch Court and the GAT case, namely the
number of territories involved by the validity claim or the positive or

319. Id. at 4.4. Contra Frigo, supra note 7, according to whom the GAT decision
should be positively evaluated since it grants the principle of legal certainty, in conformity
with Article 6 of the ECHR.
320. Id. at 4.5.
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negative nature of the infringement claim at stake, are indeed to be
considered irrelevant to the Brussels System’s norms of exclusive
jurisdiction, as interpreted by the ECJ.
VI. COROLLARIES
A. General Corollaries
The conclusions regarding the relation between the exclusive
jurisdiction rules related to IPR cases and the fundamental human right
of access to courts Article 6 ECHR, mutatis mutandis, are analogous to
the conclusions regarding the relation between the same exclusive
jurisdiction rules and the denial of justice/forum necessitatis rules. This
analogy constitutes a final argument in favor of the thesis demonstrated
here, according to which exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPR cases are not
imposed either for reasons of comity or by the territoriality principle
codified in international public law treaties, are even illegal according to
international public law, and therefore should be abandoned. Those
conclusions concern IPRs infringement issues, and also IPRs validity
claims raised as a defense in infringement proceedings.
B. European Union IPRs
These conclusions apply also with respect to the European Union
322
IPRs, such as the Community trademark.
Hence, with regard to
claims related to infringement actions, actions for declaration of noninfringement, and counterclaims for revocation or for a declaration of
invalidity of the Community trademarks, Articles 92–94 of the
323
Community Trademark Regulation pose “exclusive jurisdiction” rules.
However, on the one hand, from an EU member States’ perspective,
those norms do not ground the international jurisdiction of a sole and
exclusive competent court, but, rather, establish a plurality of possible
different competent tribunals, namely of the (trademark) courts of the
EU member State chosen by the parties according to the Brussels
Convention (now Brussels I Regulation), or, alternatively, of the EU
member State where the defendant is domiciled or has an
establishment, where the plaintiff is domiciled or has an establishment,

321. Id. at 4.4.
322. See Council Regulation 40/94, The Community Trade Mark, 1993 O.J. (L 011) 1
(EC).
(See
the
amendments
to
this
Regulation
at
http://oami.europa.eu/en/mark/aspects/reg/reg4094.htm).
323. Id. at art. 92–94.
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where the Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market (OHIM) has
its seat, or where the infringement has been committed or threatened
(with the exception of actions for a declaration of non-infringement of a
324
Community trade mark.)
Thus, those “exclusive jurisdiction” rules,
not being at all exclusive, do not conflict with the norms of public
international law on denial of justice and on the fundamental human
right of access to courts.
On the other hand, from a non EU member States’ perspective,
Articles 92–94 of the Community Trademark Regulation aim at
impeding access to courts other than the exclusively competent EU
tribunals. Thus, with respect to non-EU countries, Articles 92–94 of the
Community Trademark Regulation effectively establish exclusive
jurisdiction rules, even though in favor of more than one EU court.
Therefore, these rules can conflict with the rules of public international
law on the denial of justice and on the fundamental human right of
access to courts.
The conclusions just reached with respect to the Community
trademarks also apply in relation to other European and Community IP
325
326
rights, such as plant variety rights and design.
C. European Unified Patent Judiciary
Finally, the same conclusions of the here-purported and
demonstrated thesis, apply with respect to the 2009 Council presidency
327
Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified Patent Judiciary (ECPC),
324. Id. at art. 92–94.
325. See Council Regulation 2100/94, Community plant variety rights, 1994 O.J. (L 227)
1 (EC).
326. See Council Regulation 6/2002, Community designs, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC).
327. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the European Union patent, COM (2000)
2000/0177
final
(Nov.
28,
2000),
available
at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16113-ad01.en09.pdf. See also European
Community Patents Court Draft Agreement, 7928/09 PI 23 COUR 29 (Mar. 23, 2009),
available
at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/3C42A8FB1B30CA1AC125770D003
0AB65/$File/draft_agreement_European_and_Community_Patents_Court_en.pdf.
See
Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 817. For an historical perspective see Sven J.R. Bostyn, The
Unbearable Heaviness of Harmonization: SPLT and CP, I BREVETTI PER INVEZIONE FRA
DIRITTO EUROPEO E NAZIONALE, 128 (Marco Ricolfi ed., 2004); Jurgen Schade, Is The
Community (EU) Patent Beyond the Times?—Globalisation Urges Multilateral Cooperation,
INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 806 (2010). See also Request for an
opinion submitted by the Council of the European Union pursuant to Article 300(6) EC, 2009
O.J. (C 220/15); and the “statement of position by the Advocates General” presented on July
2, 2010 but published over six weeks after the date of July 2 given on the document in French
(the official language of the document) on a patent lawyer’s blog. See the informal English
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which “enjoys the support of the Commission, which is now seeking to
receive a mandate to open negotiations with States parties to the
European Patent Convention (EPC) over the Draft Agreement, and to
obtain an opinion from the ECJ under Article 300.6 EC on the
328
compatibility with the EC Treaty.” This proposal aims to establish a
unitary and specialized patent judiciary, a new international
organization with a central division and several regional and local
divisions, which will be designated by member States as their national
exclusively competent court to deal with European patents and
respectively future Community patents validity and infringement issues.
Particularly, the ECPC central division will be competent to address the
actions for revocations, i.e., the validity claims principally raised, the
validity issues incidentally raised, and all the claims for which are
competent the local and regional divisions. In contrast, the ECPC
regional or local divisions will be competent to address the infringement
claims (when localized in the State where the defendant is domiciled or,
alternatively, in the State where the infringement occurs), including
provisional measures, damages etc., and the revocation counter claims,
i.e., validity issues incidentally raised. Then, in the majority of the cases,
the ECPC will grant unitary litigation with significant positive effects as
compared to the status quo of fragmented litigation.
However, the distribution of jurisdiction “requires further
elaboration in the Proposal or in flanking rules, e.g. insofar as currently
no common jurisdiction [rules] for actions against multiple
329
defendants” and consolidation of proceedings related to coordinated
infringements of European patents are provided.
Finally, for the limited purposes of this Paper I would just briefly
mention from a European perspective, the ECPC determines more than
one competent court and also favors decentralization, lowering “entry
thresholds (such as language, distance, costs, mentality) for parties to
330
the litigation, and is therefore generally to be welcomed.” However,
from a non-European perspective, the ECPC litigation system impedes
the access to non-EU courts, raising the same concerns as the
Community Trademark Regulation, particularly where the owner of the
translation of this document at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2010/08/eu-opinionon-the-compatibility-of-the-proposed-european-patent-court-system-with-european-treatyla.html. See also Pagenberg, supra note 219, at 695.
328. See Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 820. On the request for an ECJ opinion see
supra note 327.
329. See Jaeger et al., supra note 149, at 826.
330. Id.
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European patent does not have enough economic resources to litigate
its European patent case before the regional or central division of the
European Patent Court and especially in a language different from its
331
own.
D. Internal Jurisdiction
Finally, the here-purported and demonstrated thesis relates to the
international jurisdiction and does not concern the allocation of
jurisdiction in purely domestic cases. Nevertheless, even with respect to
those cases, when determining the court competent to address an IRPs
issue, the States shall allow the petitioning of more than one court,
thereby avoiding a denial of justice and safeguarding the fundamental
human right of access to courts.
E. Forum Shopping
The exclusive jurisdiction rules determine a single forum that has
international jurisdiction to hear the case, impeding forum shopping,
332
and favoring the principle of legal certainty.
In contrast, one could
think that the conclusions here proposed favor forum shopping, and
333
Thus,
“are so malleable as to render them non-criteria in practice.”
one could think that the conclusions proposed here are in contrast to the
need of legal certainty. However, it is not so. First, the conclusions here
proposed allow the petitioning of a limited number of courts other than
the one that would have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the
public international rules considered here do not ground the
international jurisdiction of whichever court, but rather ground the
international jurisdiction of the courts of the States to which the case at
stake is sufficiently and not fortuitously linked, in conformity with the
331. See Statement of positions by the Advocates General, supra note 327, section c.
332. See FRIGO, supra note 7.
333. As such see RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 182, who, however, criticizes these
critics as adopting a “defeatist approach,” which shall not be embraced. The author purports
that a general principle of public international law exists according to which states shall
exercise their jurisdiction in civil and commercial transnational matters taking duly into
account the interests of the international community and thus in a reasonable way. Then, the
general principle of international law of the reasonable jurisdiction not only “requires that
States restrain their jurisdiction, but also . . . require[s] them to actually exercise their
jurisdiction when such would be in the interest of the international community” (p.5). Thus,
the reasonableness principle leads to similar conclusions as the general principle of law of the
access to a court, namely both principles impede the exorbitant fora (p. 165), as much as the
exclusive jurisdiction ones.
See RYNGAERT, supra note 12, passim, for relevant
jurisprudential and normative references to the general principle of law of the reasonable
jurisdiction.
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general principles of law of proportionality and genuine connection.
Also, the conclusions proposed here arise from the international public
law rules related to the right of access to courts, and as mentioned, those
335
rules prevail over the need of legal certainty.
Moreover, the existence of more than one court with international
jurisdiction over the case in question constitutes the typical situation
according to the Brussels System which establishes a true right to forum
shopping: this system establishes a general forum and several concurrent
fora, and while the same system does impose certain exclusive fora,
336
those are of an exceptional nature. Thus, the concurrent international
jurisdiction here proposed does not determine a legal uncertainty
different than that at the basis of the typical situation under the Brussels
system.
Finally, it is true that recent decades have seen debate aimed at
limiting forum shopping with regard to intellectual property crossborder litigation. However, this debate aimed at limiting forum
shopping has arisen only in connection with cases where the adoption
thereof was abusive. According to the debate, when “a party abusively
triggers the jurisdiction of a court in order to obtain an unjust
advantage, thus practi[c]ing unacceptable forum shopping, the court
addressed could decline jurisdiction by adopting the ‘corrective
337
mechanisms’ established by its international procedural law rules
“such as ‘forum non conveniens’ in English Law, or ‘exception de
338
fraude’ in French Law,” or imposed by the ECHR in granting to the
defendant the right to be submitted (not to exorbitant jurisdictions) but
to a fair trial. Indeed, the here-proposed conclusions do not favor
abusive forum shopping, but are instead strictly limited to that necessary
to allow the right of access to courts; and therefore, respect the general
339
principle of law imposing the avoidance of the abuse of rights.

334.
335.
336.

See RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 145, 148.
Id.
On the right of forum shopping see MARTA PERTEGAS SENDER, CROSSBORDER ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS 32 (2002); Gilles Cuniberti, Abusive Forum
Shopping?, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (May 3, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/abusiveforum-shopping/.
337. See FORUM SHOPPING IN THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL AREA (Pascal de VareillesSommières ed., 2007); Martin George, Publication: Forum Shopping in the European Judicial
Area, CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Feb. 8, 2008), http://conflictoflaws.net/2008/publicationforum-shopping-in-the-european-judicial-area/.
338. See George, supra note 337.
339. On which see RYNGAERT, supra note 12, at 150.
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VII. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FORUM STATE FOR
ITS ILLEGAL DECLINING OF JURISDICTION
A. Remedies for Denial of Justice
The exclusive jurisdiction rules in IPRs cases are contrary to the
avoidance of a denial of justice general principle of law. From a
340
secondary law or responsibility perspective the responsibility of a
341
State may arise out of improper judicial decisions.
Therefore,
declining jurisdiction over a case in conflict with forum necessitatis and
the right of access to courts triggers an international responsibility of the
342
forum State or a non-contractual liability of the European Union.
As to forum necessitatis, according also to the Report of the InterAmerican Juridical Committee in 1961, when the forum State declines
jurisdiction over a case (by virtue of exclusive jurisdiction rules
established by domestic, EU, or international norms), another State
may “initiate diplomatic claims for the protection of its nationals . . .
343
bringing an action” against the forum State and under the conditions
imposed by international public law to the exercise of diplomatic
344
protection before an international tribunal competent to address the
case, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which under
Article 38.1.c of its statute (and its case law interpretation) is competent
340. With the term “secondary law” this Paper refers to the “content of the
international responsibility of a State” and, respectively, “the implementation of the
international responsibility of a State,” as established in parts II and III of the Draft Articles
already mentioned. Precisely, this Paper refers to “the legal consequences” in the
international legal order “for the responsible State of its internationally wrongful act, in
particular with respect to cessation and reparation,” and, respectively, to “identifying the
State or States which may react to an internationally wrongful act and specifying the possible
modalities by which this may be done” (see the General Commentary n.6 of the Draft
Articles). By contrast, as this Paper concentrates on the international dimension of the
exclusive jurisdiction rules, it does not deal with the consequences of the illegal act in the
domestic legal systems involved. However, reference should be made to the circumstance
that “the responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: / (a) the claim is not brought in
accordance with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of claims; / (b) the claim is one
to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any available and effective local
remedy has not been exhausted” (as such Article 44 of the Draft Articles on Admissibility of
Claims).
341. Draft Articles, supra note 157, at ch. IV.E.1 on Article 4 Conduct of organs of a
State according to which “1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under international law, whether the organ exercises . . . judicial [functions].”
342. See PAULSSON, supra note 107, at 207.
343. See the references in Francioni, supra note 107, at 11.
344. On the condition imposed by international public law on the exercise of
diplomatic protection, among which the expiring of the internal ways of recourse and its
being a residual remedy, see CONFORTI, supra note 42, at 213.
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to adjudicate the violations of the general principles of law. In such a
case, the competent international tribunal could force the forum State
that improperly declined jurisdiction, inter alia, the reopening of the
345
proceedings and the exercise of jurisdiction over the case. In this
sense, the Belgian State recently brought an action before the ICJ
against Switzerland for having adopted private international law lato
sensu rules to decline (not its jurisdiction but) to enforce certain
346
Belgium decisions.
However, States generally do not initiate
diplomatic protection in favor of their nationals for the illegal use of
private international norms by another country, even where such
347
implies denial of justice.
Furthermore, when the rule adopted to decline jurisdiction over a
case is an EU norm, the plaintiff can bring an action directly against the
European Union before the European Court of Justice under Article
348
268 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
which states that “[t]he Court of Justice of the European Union shall
have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage
349
provided for in the second . . . paragraph[] of Article 340,” which
states that “in the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the
Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions . . . in
350
the performance of their duties,” such as the legislative duty. The ECJ

345. See Case Concerning Avena v. United States (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31). See also PAULSSON, supra note 107, at 207.
346. See Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(Belg. v. Switz.), Application, 2009 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 22), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&code=besu&case=145&k=e6. On this case see Caroline
Kleiner, Private International Law Dispute Before the ICJ (Belgium v. Switzerland on the
Interpretation and Application of the Lugano Convention), CONFLICTOFLAWS.NET (Dec. 27,
2009),
http://conflictoflaws.net/?s=Private+International+Law+Dispute+Before+the+ICJ;
Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, Una controversia relativa alla Convenzione di Lugano giunge
innanzi alla Corte internazionale di giustizia, 2 SOCIETA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE
454
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sidi-isil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/nota-Marongiu-Buonaiuti_.pdf.
347. However, see Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10
(Sept. 7). On this case see supra notes 9, 11, 15. In an action brought by the Netherlands
before the ICJ against Sweden for having this last State violated the conflict of laws rules of
an international convention see Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the
Guardianship of Infant (Neth. v. Swed.) 1958 I.C.J. 55 (Nov. 28).
348. Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community 2006 O.J. (C 321 E/2), Article 235 (TEC).
349. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
2008 O.J. (C 115/47), Article 268; ex. Article 288 TEC.
350. Id. at Article 340.
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has held that
Community law confers a right to reparation where three
conditions are met: the rule of law infringed must be
intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must
be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal
link between the breach of the obligation [by the EU
Institution] . . . and the damage sustained by the injured
351
parties[,]
352

and must also be a “higher-ranking rule of law.” Thus, with reference
to the first condition, the ECJ maintained that a rule of law confers
rights upon individuals when it poses “the right to be heard” by a
353
354
court, and hence “it is foreseeable” that such a rule can be
characterized as a high-ranking rule of law.
B. Remedies for Violation of the Fundamental Human Right of Access
to Courts
As for the fundamental human right of access to courts, and always
from a secondary law or responsibility perspective, the content of the
responsibility of the States, mutatis mutandis, is the same as that related
to the violation of forum necessitatis, save for the following peculiarities
of the ECHR system. First, when the declining of jurisdiction is
grounded on the domestic rules of the forum State, the applicant can
petition the forum State before the ECtHR according to ECHR
mechanisms. Second, when the declining of jurisdiction is based on
treaty norms, the applicant can petition the forum State before the
ECtHR, since member States of the ECHR violate its Article 6, even
when they limit the applicant’s right of access to courts to give effect to
the rules of an international agreement. Third, when the declining of
jurisdiction is based on EU norms, the applicant can still petition the
forum State before the ECtHR.
In those cases, the ECtHR’s Bosphorus jurisprudence applies,
according to which “the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can
351. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik
Deutschland & Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, 1996 E.C.R. I-1029, ¶ 51.
352. See Case C-352/98, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA v. Comm’n,
2000 E.C.J. 42, ¶ 17, available at http://curia.europa.eu.
353. Case T-193/04, Tillack v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-3995, ¶ 127.
354. See MASSIMO CONDINANZI & ROBERTO MASTROIANNI, IL CONTENZIOSO
DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 280 (2009).
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be considered to be . . . ‘equivalent’ . . . to that of the Convention
355
“By ‘equivalent’ the Court means ‘comparable’ . . . [rather
system.”
356
than] ‘identical’. Therefore, “presumption arises that [the forum EU
member State] did not depart from the requirements of the Convention
when it implemented legal obligations flowing from its membership of
357
the EC.”
[On the one hand this] presumption can be rebutted if, in
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered
that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly
deficient. In such cases, the interest of international
cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention’s
role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public
order’ in the field of human rights . . . [and the
defendant] State would be fully responsible under the
Convention [for the violation of the right of access to
358
courts].
On the other hand, the future accession of the European Union to
the ECHR according to Article 6.2 TEU will reasonably override the
presumption posed by the Bosphorus jurisprudence and has been
correctly criticized by the opinion of several judges also comprising the
Grand Chamber that enacted it. Hence, it is true that according to
Article 2 of the Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty n. 8 Relating to Article 6(2)
of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union to the
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, “[t]he
agreement relating to the accession . . . shall make provision for
preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union
359
360
law . . . .”
However, as it was recently correctly noted, it is the
355. Turizm v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, ¶ 165 (2005) available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int. See M. & Co. v. Germany, App. No. 13258/87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int, last page.
356. Turizm, App. No. 45036/98, ¶ 155.
357. Id. at ¶ 165.
358. Id. at ¶156–157.
359. Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of
the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12007L/htm/C2007306EN.01015501.htm.
360.
See Vladimiro Zagrebelsky, L’adesione Dell’UE alla CEDU: Il ‘Nodo
Giudiziario,’ ITALIAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW XV CONGRESS IN BOLOGNA
(June
10–11,
2010),
available
at
http://streaming.cineca.it/SIDI-
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European Union that is accessing to the ECHR, and not vice versa.
Furthermore, the privileged system posed by Bosphorus in favor of the
European Union will not be tolerable to all other non-EU member
States that are party to the ECHR, especially when accession of the
European Union will place it on an equal footing with them.
At any rate, the ECtHR very recently established that the
equivalence of the European Union and the ECHR systems shall be
evaluated not in the abstract but on a case-by-case basis, in a realistic
361
and not merely theoretical way.
The ECtHR, at the same time,
“expanded the subjective and objective scope of the State
responsibility” in relation to international organization, by stating in the
362
Gasparini decision that “member States are obliged, when they
transfer a part of their sovereign powers to an international
organi[z]ation to which they adhere, to scrutini[z]e that the rights
granted by the Convention will receive in the frame of the international
organi[z]ation an ‘equivalent protection’ to that of the Convention
363
system.”
Finally, in all those cases according to the ECtHR “the most
appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be trial de novo or the
reopening of the proceedings, in due course and in accordance with the
364
requirements of Article 6 of the Convention.”

XV/play.php?dim_get=320&player_get=flash&flusso_get=flash.
361.
See Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlands Kokkelvisserij U.A. v.
Netherlands, App. No. 13645/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
362. See Gasparini v. Italia and Belgium, App. No. 10750/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int (only available in French).
363. Id. “[L]es Etats membres ont l'obligation, au moment où ils transfèrent une
partie de leurs pouvoirs souverains à une organisation [sic] internationale à laquelle ils
adhèrent, de veiller à ce que les droits garantis par la Convention reçoivent au sein de cette
organisation [sic] une ‘protection équivalente’ à celle assurée par le mécanisme de la
Convention.”
364. See Somogyi v. Italy, App. No. 67972/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 86 (2004), available at
www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.

